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Power and the Subject of Religion
KURT T. LASH*
Under the First Amendment, "Congress shall make no laws respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" Nevertheless,
congressional actors have on occasion enacted laws that expressly make
religion the subject of legislation. Many scholars justify these laws on the
grounds that Congress at the time of the Founding had an implied power to
legislate on religion ifnecessary and proper to an enumerated end.
Professor Lash argues that the "implied power" theory cannot withstand
historical scrutiny Whatever "implied power" arguments may have emanated
from the orginial Constitution, those arguments were foreclosed by the adoption
of the First Amendment. However, the enactment of section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment does enable Congress to legislate-in a limited scope-on religious
matters.
I. INTRODUCTION
What precisely is the source of power enabling Congress to enact a law on
the subject of religion? I am not referring to Congress's power to make law that
incidentally affects religion, but rather law that expressly makes religion the
subject of legislation. An example of the former would be a law prohibiting the
use of peyote that has the incidental effect of prohibiting religious use of that
same drug.' An example of the latter would be a law requiring employers to
accommodate the religious beliefs of employees.2 Although laws having an
* Professor of Law and W. Joseph Ford Fellow, Loyola Law School (Los Angeles). The
author thanks Jesse Choper, Michael Curtis, Paul Hayden, Sam Pillsbury, Larry Solum, and
Ellis West for their very helpful comments on early drafts of this article. I am especially
grateful for the patient and generous suggestions of my colleague, Chris May. Salus ubi multi
consiliarii. I also thank the members of the Law and Religion listserv, most especially the
comments by Tom Berg, Alan Brownstein, Douglas Laycock, and Michael McConnell.
1 After Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), both federal and state governments have broad power to enact generally applicable
laws that incidentally burden religious exercise.
2 See Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(j) (1994)
(banning religious discrimination in employment and requiring employers to reasonably
accommodate the religious practices of their employees if they can do so without undue
hardship).
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incidental effect on religious exercise raise constitutional problems of their own,3
the second type of law-law that makes religion itself the subject of
legislation-raises unique and difficult questions of congressional authority.
Congress has long believed that it has some degree of power to regulate on
the subject of religion: the United States Code is riddled with such laws. From
the creation of the congressional chaplaincy in 1789,4 to the 1864 Civil War
exemptions from military service for religious objectors,5 to the Prohibition-era
exemptions for sacramental use of alcohol,6 each generation of legislators has
enacted laws that expressly address-and regulate-some form of religious
exercise.7
3 In the years since the Court's decision in Smith, a great deal of scholarly attention has
focused on the issue of religious freedom from laws incidentally burdening religious exercise.
See Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion
Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 75, 94-96 (1990);
Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical
Perspective, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 915 (1992); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free
Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1; Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 743, 754 (1992) (describing the academic commentary on Smith as 'mostly
critical"); Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990). I have also addressed this subject. See Kurt T. Lash,
The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. L. REV. 1106 (1994).
4 Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 70-71.
5 Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 6, 9.
6 Prohibition of Intoxicating Beverages, ch. 85 § 3, 41 Stat. 307, 308 (1919), repealed by
Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, ch. 740, § 1, 49 Stat. 872, 872 (1935).
7 To cite but a few additional examples: the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 allows states to distribute their federal welfare block
grants to charitable and other private groups, including religious organizations. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 604a (Supp. 1996). The Act further provides: "No funds provided directly to institutions or
organizations to provide services and administer programs... shall be expended for sectarian
worship, instruction, or proselytization." Id. Laws regulating the armed forces permit members
to wear religious apparel. See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1994). Ministers are exempt from compulsory
military training and service. See 50 U.S.C. § 456(g) (1994). The American Indian Religious
Freedom Act provides an exemption from all state or federal laws for the use of peyote by
Native Americans. See 42 U.S.C..§ 1996a(b)(1) (1994). The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3607 (1994), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 337, 363 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (1994)), both contain exemptions for religious
organizations. Federal law provides criminal sanctions against anyone who defaces or destroys
religious real property because of the religious character of that property, or intentionally
obstructs by force or threat of force someone's free exercise of his religious beliefs. See 18
U.S.C. § 247 (1994). The Equal Access Act requires equal access for religious expression in
public secondary schools. See Equal Access Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-377, 98 Stat. 1302,
1302-04 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1994)). Federal copyright law
1070 [Vol. 59:1069
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Although the Supreme Court has limited congressional power to regulate
religious matters,8 a majority of the Court has consistently indicated that both
state and federal governments have some power to regulate this area.9 Indeed, the
Court has characterized nonmandatory accommodation of religion 10 as
"follow[ing] the best of our traditions."'I In the recent case City of Boerne v.
provides exemptions for materials used for religious purposes. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(3)-(4)
(1994). Federal food inspection laws contain exemptions for the ritual slaughter of animals and
the preparation of food in accordance with religious practices. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1902, 1906
(1994). There are many others examples. See generally James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445-
47 & nn. 217-34 (detailing lower courts' applications of the Free Exercise Clause and noting
that the lower courts' positions mirror that of the government).
8 See City ofBoeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (striking down in part the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act as beyond congressional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (striking down special school
district for Hasidic village); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (invalidating on
establishment grounds a state sales tax exemption for religious literature); Estate of Thorton v.
Caldore, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (striking down a law requiring employers to accommodate
Sabbath day beliefs of employees).
9 See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (upholding the Equal Access Act);
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding Title VII
exemptions for employment by religious entities); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)
(upholding tax exemptions to religious organizations); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965) (upholding, but broadly construing, the religious exemptions in the Universal Military
Training and Service Act); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding release time
program); see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987)
("This Court has long recognized that the govemment may (and sometimes must)
accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment
Clause."); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that
government is permitted "to take religion into account when necessary to further secular
purposes unrelated to the advancement of religion, and to exempt, when possible, from
generally applicable govemmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices
would othervise thereby be infringed") (footnote omitted). Justice Stevens appears to be the
only Justice opposed to all free exercise accommodations. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at
2172 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that discretionary religious accommodations violate the
Establishment Clause).
10 By "nonmandatory," I refer to legislation that is neither required nor forbidden by the
Constitution.
11 See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-14 ("We are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being.... When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates
with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it
follows the best of our traditions.'); see also Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (stating that religious exemptions from generally applicable
laws are most often a matter of legislative discretion, not constitutional mandate); Amos, 483
U.S. at 338 ("[Our cases teach] that there is ample room for accommodation of religion under
19981 1071
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Flores,12 although the Court struck down part of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) as beyond congressional power under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment,13 once again a majority of the Supreme Court indicated
that Congress has some degree of power to regulate on behalf of religion. With
the exception of Justice Stevens, 14 all of the Justices in Boerne either wrote or
the Establishment Clause."); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 453 (1971) ("[I]t is hardly
impermissible for Congress to attempt to accommodate free exercise values, in line with 'our
happy tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates of conscience."') (citation
omitted); Walz, 397 U.S. at 673 ('The limits ofpermissible state accommodation to religion are
by no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.").
The Supreme Court has also permitted, if not encouraged, laws targeting religion that seek
to separate church and state beyond the degree otherwise mandated by the federal Constitution.
A number of state courts have interpreted their state constitutions to require stricter separation
of church and state than that mandated by the federal Constitution. See, e.g., Witters v.
Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), reaff'd sub nom. Witters v.
State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989) (holding that there was no violation
of federal Establishment Clause in case of state financial assistance to visually disabled student
attending Christian college for purpose of studying for the ministry, but, on remand, same
assistance struck down by state supreme court on ground of state constitutional provision
prohibiting use of public money for religious instruction); see also California Teachers Ass'n v.
Riles, 632 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1981); Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1983) (striking
down loaning of textbooks by public school districts to parochial schools even though U.S.
Supreme Court has upheld this practice under the federal Establishment Clause); Opinion of
the Justices (Choice in Education), 616 A.2d 478, 480 (N.H. 1992) (advising that a school
choice program that includes religious schools would violate the New Hampshire state
constitution).
12 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
13 The decision focused on that part of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
that required the states to accommodate religious exercise. It was this aspect of RFRA that
went beyond congressional power under § 5. The Court did not address that aspect of RFRA
which applied against the federal government and, presumably, remains in effect. The Court,
however, may be poised to strike down this aspect as well. See In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th
Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded in light of the Boeme decision; Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997) (vacating lower court decision upholding
claim under RFRA against application of federal bankruptcy law). Lower federal courts that
have addressed the issue are split. Compare Alamo v. Clay, 137 F.3d 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(assuming "without deciding, that the RFRA applies to the federal government
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in City ofBoerne"), with Robinson v. District of
Columbia Government, No. Civ. A. 97-787 (GK), 1997 WL 607450, at *1 n.1 (D.D.C. July
17, 1997) (rejecting the plaintiff's RFRA claims-in a challenge to the District of Columbia
government's actions as an employer-on the grounds that "the Supreme Court's decision in
City ofBoerne v. Flores, declared that act unconstitutional") (citation omitted).
14 Justice Stevens is the only member of the current Court who believes that all legislative
attempts to expressly accommodate religion are unconstitutional. See City ofBoerne, 117 S. Ct.
at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring).
1072 ['Vol. 59:1069
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joined opinions indicating that Congress does have power to make special
provisions for religion, as long as it does so within certain limits.15 In the weeks
following the Boerne decision, a number of scholars testified that RFRA could
be reenacted in much the same form as long as Congress relied on some other
power besides section 5.16 Indeed, among legal scholars, there is a remarkable
15 See id at 2163 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (stating that Congress "can enact
legislation under § 5 enforcing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion"); id. at
2174 (Scalia, J., concurring) (interpreting the historical intent behind the Free Exercise Clause
as allowing, but not requiring, legislative accommodation of religion); id. at 2179 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the original framers of the First Amendment anticipated that
legislatures would have an affirmative duty to protect religious exercise).
16 See, e.g., House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee Hearing on "Protecting
Religious Freedom After Boeme v. Flores" (visited Dec. 4, 1998) <http://www.house.gov/judi-
ciary/222308.htm> (testimony of Douglas Laycock, Associate Dean for Research, University
of Texas Law School given July 14, 1997) (citing, among other sources of congressional
power to reenact religious freedom legislation, the Treaty Clause, the Commerce Clause, the
Spending Clause, and limited use of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Protecting Religious
Freedom after Boerne v. Flores: Testimony to the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House
Comm. On the Judiciary (July 14, 1997) available in 1997 WL 11234759 (testimony of
Thomas C. Berg, Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University)
(citing the Treaty Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Spending Clause, and limited use of § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 1997 WL 11234761 (testimony of Mark E. Chopko,
General Counsel, U.S. Catholic Conference) (citing the Spending Clause, Commerce Clause,
and the Necessary and Proper Clause).
Even those scholars who argued that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied against ihe
states generally conceded that Congress has some degree of power to regulate religion. See Jay
Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1625 nA01 (1995) (rejecting the idea that
Congress has power to require states to accommodate religion, but noting that "Congress has a
much stronger claim under the Necessary and Proper Clause" to provide "religious
exemption[s] for activities legitimately regulated under its enumerated powers"); Daniel 0.
Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional Significance of an
Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39, 76 (1995) ("Although the Court's
Establishment Clause doctrine forbids the government to promote religion, for example, it has
been construed to permit religion-based exemptions from governmentally imposed burdens.");
Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the
Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 357,
363 (1994) ("The First Amendment does not empower Congress to regulate federal law in
order to achieve religious liberty unless it does so pursuant to an enumerated power."); Ira C.
Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56
MONT. L. REV. 171,213 (1995) (arguing that constitutional difficulties raised by the enactment
of RFRA have to do with its application to the states, not the general power of Congress to
accommodate religion under a separately enumerated power); Jed Rubenfeld,
Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA Really Was Unconstitutional, 95 MICH. L. REV.
2347, 2357 (1997) ('There may be distinctively federal domains-say, in the issuance of
money, in regulating the armed forces, in making rules for its own legislative sessions, in
1998) 1073
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degree of consensus that the government (both state and federal) has some
degree of discretion to regulate on the subject of religion, whether by direct
regulation (like Title VII's anti-religious discrimination provisions), or by
exempting religiously motivated conduct from otherwise generally applicable
law. 17
governing territories, and so on-in which Congress can constitutionally make laws
intermeddling with religion.").
17 See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 123 (1995) ("Restorative or
equalizing accommodations for religion that do not meaningfilly interfere with religious
freedom should be permissible...."); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 238
(1st ed. 1986) (stating that accommodation is allowed if its purpose is to protect religious
freedom); STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 126 (1995) (arguing that religious liberty issues generally,
and accommodation in particular, should be left to the political process); see also Thomas C.
Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 62 n.274 (1994) ("Congress has power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause... to take steps to ensure that free exercise values are respected
in any federal program."); Bybee, supra note 16, at 1625 nA01 (rejecting the idea that
Congress has power to require states to accommodate religion, but noting that "Congress has a
much stronger claim under the Necessary and Proper Clause" to provide "religious
exemption[s] for activities legitimately regulated under its enumerated powers"); Conkle, supra
note 16, at 76 ("Although the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine forbids the government to
promote religion, for example, it has been construed to permit religion-based exemptions from
governmentally imposed burdens."); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1267 (1994) ('To observe that the burden or nobility of religious belief
offers no grounds for constitutionally privileging religion is not to deny the capacity of
legislative bodies to accommodate religious beliefs or even help religious institutions to
prosper, where good reasons exist for so doing."); Hamilton, supra note 16, at 363 ('The First
Amendment does not empower Congress to regulate federal law in order to achieve religious
liberty unless it does so pursuant to an enumerated power"); Douglas Laycock, Religious
Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313 (1996) (explaining that permissive
religious exemptions are consistent with "substantive neutrality"); Lupu, supra note 16, at 213
("Congress presumably has affirmative power to protect religious freedom; whatever power
authorizes the underlying legislation will support an accommodation of religious liberty as part
of the legislative scheme."); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise
Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 323 (1991) ("A conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause
does not require a particular result does not mean that the Establishment Clause necessarily
prohibits that result.... Where should be some space for permissible legislative action
between the two constitutional commands."); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 140 (1992) (approving of the Court's interpretation of the
Establishment Clause that allows the government to "exempt religious organizations from a
regulatory burden, even when not required to do so under the Free Exercise Clause."); Bonnie
I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings: A Defense of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 589, 677 n.358 (1996) ("The relevant enumerated power
authorizing Congress to apply [RFRA] ... is that which authorizes each federal law, regulation
1074 [Vol. 59:1069
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Despite this remarkable degree of consensus, 18 however, it is not at all clear
where Congress gets its power over religious matters.19 No text in the
Constitution expressly grants the federal government power over the subject. The
religion clauses of the First Amendment, although they address the subject of
religious freedom, do so in terms of limiting, not granting, power.20 Twentieth
century constitutional lawyers, of course, are not deterred by the lack of an
enumerated power; the common presumption is that Congress has power to
address the subject of religion as long as doing so is "necessary and proper" to
advance an enumerated responsibility.21 Although this reasoning has justified
broad federal power under the Commerce Clause since the New Deal,22 it is not
or policy from which a free exercise exemption is sought.... Congress needs no independent
enumerated power to pass laws protecting the free exercise of religion against federal
interference.").
18 Even those vho argued that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied against the states,
generally conceded that Congress had some degree of power to regulate religion. See Bybee,
supra note 16, at 1625 nA01 (rejecting the idea that Congress has power to require states to
accommodate religion, but noting that "Congress has a much stronger claim under the
Necessary and Proper Clause" to provide "religious exemption[s] for activities legitimately
regulated under its enumerated powers"); Conkle, supra note 16, at 76 ("Although the Court's
Establishment Clause doctrine forbids the government to promote religion, for example, it has
been construed to permit religion-based exemptions from governmentally imposed burdens");
Hamilton, supra note 16, at 363 ('The First Amendment does not empower Congress to
regulate federal law in order to achieve religious liberty unless it does so pursuant to an
enumerated power."); Lupu, supra note 16, at 213 (arguing that constitutional difficulties
raised by the enactment of RFRA have to do with its application to the states, not the general
power of Congress to accommodate religion under a separately enumerated power);
Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 2357 ('There may be distinctively federal domains-say, in the
issuance of money, in regulating the armed forces, in making rules for its own legislative
sessions, in governing territories, and so on-in which Congress can constitutionally make
laws intermeddling with religion.").
19 The Supreme Court, although often referring to such power, has never directly
identified the enumerated source of federal power to regulate on the subject of religion. See
supra note 16. Generally, the Court avoids any discussion of precisely where the power comes
from, and instead simply asserts that the religion clauses are not so restrictive as to prevent
exercises of benevolent neutrality. See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 334 (1987). But see Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 371 (1970) (White, J.,
dissenting) (proposing the Necessary and Proper Clause as a source of congressional power to
accommodate religion).
20 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."); see also infra note 75 and accompanying
text.
21 See sources cited supra note 16.
22 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
1998] 1075
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immediately clear why the same approach works when it comes to religion.
Whatever else the New Deal accomplished in terms of federal power, it has
never been understood to have granted or expanded federal power to regulate
First Amendment subjects. 23 Thus, explaining federal power to regulate religion
seems to warrant either a rethinking (and expansion) of the New Deal's impact
on federal power24 or a serious investigation into congressional powers that pre-
existed the New Deal. Unfortunately, the issue has received little attention-
most scholars assumed that Congress's "necessary and proper" power reaches
religion just as easily as it reaches private racial discrimination and home grown
wheat.25
Perhaps one reason for the lack of scholarly treatment of this issue is that,
until recently, the vast majority of legislation on the subject of religion arguably
was required by the Constitution. For example, from 1973 to 1990, the Supreme
Court occasionally interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to require exemptions
from otherwise generally applicable laws.26 Both state and federal governments
were obligated to provide a religious exemption from a generally applicable law
in any case in which there was no compelling reason to bind the religious
objector. Under this interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, Congress had
good reason to write express free exercise exemptions into the law, if only as a
preemptive strike against later constitutional litigation.27 Similarly, during this
23 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
24 This is something the current Court may be willing to undertake, but not in the
direction of adding to federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. See Printz v.
United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
25 Scholars asserting that Congress has such power under separately enumerated powers
by way of the Necessary and Proper Clause invariably make the assertion with no more than
one or two sentences of explanation. See sources cited supra notes 17 & 19. One issue that has
received sustained attention is whether the Establishment Clause permits Congress to promote
or advance the cause of religion. Compare CHESTER JAMES ANTiEAu Er AL., FREEDOM FROM
FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT: FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RELIGION CLAUSES (1964), and GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN
AMRICA (1987), with LEVY, supra note 17, and Douglas Laycock, "Non-Preferential" Aid to
Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875 (1987). The
general discussion in these works, however, has to do with the limits of the Establishment
Clause, and not whether Congress has power to promote the free exercise of religion.
2 6 See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment See., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Vemner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) ("In every case the power to
regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the
protected freedom.").
27 See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 369-71 (1970) (White, J., dissenting)
(noting that even if the Free Exercise Clause does not require exempting devout believers from
1076 [Vol. 59:1069
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same general period, the Supreme Court interpreted the Establishment Clause to
prevent (in many cases) participation by religious groups in general government
benefits programs.28 Under this interpretation of the Establishment Clause,
Congress might wish to expressly exclude religious groups from government
benefits programs in order to comply with the restrictions of the Establishment
Clause.29
Most recently, however, the Supreme Court has pared back the scope of both
religion clauses and replaced constitutional mandates with political discretion. In
Employment Division v. Smith,30 the Court held that, in all but the narrowest of
circumstances, religious exemptions are a matter of legislative choice, not
constitutional right.31 As a result of Smith, exemptions previously thought to be
required by the Free Exercise Clause now exist purely as a matter of legislative
grace.32 Or, put another way, after Smith accommodation of religion is mainly a
question of discretionary legislative power.33
the military, it was "necessary and proper" in exercising its military powers for Congress "to
take account of the First Amendment and to avoid possible violations of the Free Exercise
Clause"); see also Robin-Vergeer, supra note 17, at n.621; Michael W. McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 685 (1992). For a general discussion regarding statutes enacted to track the requirements
of the Constitution, see Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA.
L. REV. 1 (1993).
28 See, e.g., School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
29 For example, a public school might wish to limit the use of its facilities by community
religious organizations in order to avoid advancing the cause of religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993).
30 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
31 See id. at 890.
32 Following the Smith decision, a number of state courts began to decide free exercise
claims under their own constitutions. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 236
(Mass. 1994); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8 (Minn. 1990). See generally Stuart G. Parsell,
Note, Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion Under State Constitutions: A Response to
Employment Division v. Smith, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (1993) (arguing that state courts
have increasingly relied on state Free Exercise Clauses to avoid the Court's narrow reading of
the federal Free Exercise Clause). Not all changes, however, were favorable towards religion.
Following Smith, some administrative accommodations were withdrawn. See, e.g., 62 Fed.
Reg. 3,534, 3,535 (Jan. 23, 1997) (regarding post-Smith revocation of exemption for Amish
and Sikhs from requirement of wearing hard hats on construction sites).
33 According to Professor Ira Lupu:
By writing courts out of, and all other branches into, the accommodation process, Smith
eliminates constitutional compulsion from the field and replaces it with political discretion
1998]
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Similarly, recent Supreme Court decisions appear to allow legislative
discretion to regulate religion in an effort to maintain the separation of church
and state. In earlier "Lemon-period"34 cases like Aguilar v. Felton35 and School
District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball,36 the Court interpreted the
Establishment Clause to forbid participation by religious groups in generally
funded government programs due to the threat of excessive government
entanglement with religion. However, since the late 1980s, the Court has moved
away from the Lemon test 37 and increasingly interprets the Establishment Clause
to require no more than government "neutrality" in the disbursement of
government benefits.38 For example, the Court recently reversed the holding in
to respond to the special claims of religion. The zone of accommodation has thus grown
wider and perhaps more permissive than at any time in the past thirty years. The scope of
such accommodation is crucial to religious persons and institutions seeking to advance
claims of religious exemption, because they are now directed to turn exclusively to
nonjudicial bodies for redress.
Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary
Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PENN. L. REv. 555, 574 (1991) (footnotes omitted); see
also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California, 493 U.S. 378 (1990)
(holding that religious-based tax exemptions are not required under the Free Exercise Clause);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (holding that religious-based tax exemptions are
permissible under the Establishment Clause).
34 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking down Pennsylvania statutes
which provided for the use of public school funding to supplement teachers' salaries and other
educational resources at parochial schools).
35 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (striking down the use of federal funds to pay for the salaries of
public school teachers who teach in parochial schools).
36 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (striking down use of public school funds for a "shared time"
program in which public school teachers "leased" classrooms from religious schools for the
purposes of remedial education).
37 In Lemon, the Court established a three-pronged test for the constitutionality of statutes
"respecting" religion. See 403 U.S. at 612. "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted).
38 For example, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481 (1986), reaffd on state constitutional grounds sub nom. Witters v. State Comm'n for the
Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989), the Court held that the federal Establishment Clause does
not prevent a theology student from using neutrally distributed educational funds to subsidize
his religious vocational education. Similarly, in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,
509 U.S. 1 (1993), the Court held that the Establishment Clause does not prevent a federally
funded sign language interpreter from accompanying a deaf student into a religious school,
when the presence of the interpreter is due to the choices of the student and not the state. Most
recently, the Court has held that in cases involving religious expression, the Establishment
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Aguilar and held that the Establishment Clause allows religious schools to
receive the same Title I educational assistance provided to secular public and
private schools.39 However, even as the Court has reduced the restrictions of the
Establishment Clause, it has left open the possibility that Congress or the states
may require stricter separation of church and state than that mandated by the
Establishment Clause. For example, in Witters v. Washington Department of
Services for the Blind,40 the Court held that the Establishment Clause did not
forbid a student from using state vocational assistance monies for tuition at a
religious college.41 The Court then remanded the case to state court-which
promptly denied the aid under the "stricter" provisions of the Washington
Constitution.42 The ultimate result in Witters, then, was to allow states the
discretion to impose non-establishment norms not otherwise required by the
federal Establishment Clause.43 Presumably, the federal government has no less
discretion than the states on this matter. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that
the restrictions placed on the federal government by way of the First Amendment
are coextensive with the restrictions placed on the states by way of the
Fourteenth.44 Thus, if states have some degree of discretion to pursue their
Clause does not require-and the Free Speech Clause forbids--discrimination against a
religious viewpoint. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
(1995); Rosenberger v. Rector of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). Although these cases limit the degree of
government discretion to avoid entanglements between church and state (real or perceived), the
Court has not indicated whether this rule will apply in cases not involving expressive activity.
Indeed, it would be remarkable if it did, for it would amount to moving from "constitutionally
forbidden" to "constitutionally required" in the space of about 11 years. To the extent that
Rosenberger represents the Court's narrowing of the requirements of the Establishment Clause,
its ultimate effect will be an increase, not a decrease of government discretion to include or
exclude religious organizations in generally funded government benefits programs.
39 See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2003 (1997).
40 474 U.S. at 481-90, reaffid on state constitutionalgrounds ub nom. Witters v. State
Comm'n for the Blind [hereinafter Witters I1], 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989).
41 See id.
42 See Witters II, 771 P.2d at 1119, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989).
43 See generally Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing Separation of
Church and State Through State Constitutional Provisions, 71 VA. L. REV. 625 (1985)
(describing "the more restrictive stance taken by many state courts interpreting state
establishment clauses").
44See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231-32 (1995) ("[Tihe
Constitution imposes upon federal, state, and local governmental actors the same obligation to
respect the personal right to equal protection of the laws."); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
500 (1954) ("[]t would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty
[than that on the states] on the federal government.").
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"affirmative obligation" to avoid the establishing of religion,45 so does the
federal government.
This gradual shift in the Court's interpretation of both religion clauses has
resulted in a jurisprudential gap: laws once arguably required by the Constitution
now appear to be a matter of political choice. When it comes to the federal
government, however, exercising such a choice requires an enumerated power.
The existence and scope of such power has never been-has never before had to
be-adequately explained. This article is an attempt to do just that. I should say
from the outset that I believe there is such a source of power. Locating it, and
tracing its contours, however, is more difficult than one might suppose and
deserving of far deeper analysis than the subject has previously received.
Part II of this article explores the possibility that the original Constitution
contained an implied power over the subject of religion. Although the most
plausible reading of the historical evidence suggests that no such power was
granted, the evidence could support the position that the original Constitution
granted Congress some degree of power to regulate on the subject of religion
when necessary and proper to the advancement of an enumerated end.
Part III then considers the impact of the adoption of the First Amendment.
The text of the First Amendment and the historical context in which it was
enacted suggest that the two religion clauses added nothing to Congress's power
under Article I and instead were meant to foreclose the possibility that
Congress's necessary and proper powers might reach the subject of religion.
Part IV tests the conclusions of Parts II and H by taking a close look at the
actions of the federal government in the period following the adoption of the
First Amendment. Although there are some examples of Congress exercising
power over the subject of religion, there are fewer unambiguous examples than
often claimed and not enough to outweigh the remarkably consistent public
interpretations of the religion clauses by those most closely involved with their
enactment.
Finally, Part V (appropriately enough) discusses section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the possibility that this provision grants Congress a degree of
power to regulate on the subject of religion. I conclude that section 5 is such a
plausible source of congressional power, and that, to this extent, the Fourteenth
Amendment altered the substantive content of the original First Amendment.
This part concludes by comparing and contrasting federal power created under
section 5 with the more commonly asserted power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause. Because section 5's grant of power is limited to measures
45 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[The Establishment Clause] imposes affirmative obligations that
may require a State, in some situations, to take steps to avoid being perceived as supporting or
endorsing a private religious message.").
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protecting constitutionally defined religious liberty, Congress may not exercise
power over the subject of religion even if necessary and proper to some other
enumerated end.
II. THE CASE FOR AN UNENUMERATED POWER OVER THE SUBJECT OF
RELIGION IN THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION
Had Congress undertaken to guaranty religious freedom, or any particular
species of it, they would then have had a pretense to interfere in a subject they
have nothing to do with. Each state, so far as the clause in question does not
interfere, must be left to the operation of its own principles.
-James fredel146
The original Constitution contains no provision directly granting Congress
power over the subject of religion. Although Article VI bans religious tests for
federal office,47 this provision was not understood to increase congressional
power beyond the list of enumerated responsibilities in Article J.48 Thus, if the
original Constitution contained any degree of power over the subject of religion,
such power existed only by implication; either as "necessary and proper" to
advance an enumerated end,4 9 or as an aspect of Congress's plenary powers to
46 Debate in North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 30, 1788) [hereinafter Debate in
North Carolina], reprinted in 5 THE FoUNDERS' CONSTmTuroN 89, 90 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lemer eds., 1987).
47 See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."). See generally Gerard V.
Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine
That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674 (1987) (discussing the Article VI ban
on religious test and arguing that "all we need to know about the appropriate constitutional
philosophy of religion: there is none").
48 See Debate in North Carolina, supra note 46 (statements of James Iredell). Some
Antifederalists feared that the Test Clause implied the existence of power over religion not
otherwise prohibited by the Constitution. See Essay by Cincinnatus, N.Y.J., Nov. 15, 1787,
reprinted in 6 THE COPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 13, 14 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) ('This
exception implies, and necessarily implies, that in all other cases whatever liberty of conscience
may be regulated. For, though no such power is expressly given, yet it is plainly meant to be
included in the general powers, or else this exception would have been totally
unnecessary .... "). The Federalists, of course, denied the existence of such implied power.
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ('The Congress shall have power... [t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers... ).
Whether viewed as an aspect of the necessary and proper clause itself, or as an inherent aspect
of the express grant of power, the result would be the same. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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tax and spend for the public welfare.50
A. The Possibilities of the Text
To begin with, nothing in the original Constitution prohibits including laws
on the subject of religion among the implied powers of Congress. In other words,
it does no violence to the text of the original Constitution (prior to the First and
Tenth Amendments) for Congress to regulate religion when doing so was
"necessary and proper" to the achievement of an enumerated end. For example,
under its original Commerce Clause power, it is textually plausible that Congress
had power to prohibit state religious establishments if those establishments
interfered with the free flow of commerce.51 Or, pursuant to a duly ratified
treaty, Congress might have prohibited state laws interfering with the religious
exercise of foreign dignitaries.52 Similarly, Congress might have established the
First Church of the United States if it thought doing so would facilitate interstate
commerce or enhance troop morale (providing a place of worship for soldiers far
from their home state).53 In fact, under a broad reading of the Tax and Spending
50 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States .... ).
51 Such laws might include state laws prohibiting the sale or distribution of religious
materials critical of the official state religion (interfering with movement of goods), or laws
prohibiting the practice of certain religions (interfering with the movement of persons). See
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 204 (1824) (indicating that Congress may regulate
purely local activity "incidental to the power expressly granted to congress"). In fact, prior to
the adoption of the First and Tenth Amendments, Congress might have acted to prohibit local
churches from discriminating on the basis of race, due to the impact on the interstate movement
of persons. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding
congressional regulation of private discrimination in hotels due to indirect impact on interstate
commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding congressional
regulation of private discrimination in restaurants due to indirect impact on interstate
commerce).
52 See U.S. CONST. art. H1, § 2 ("[The Executive] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties.... ."); id. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have
Power to ... make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."); id. art. VI, cl. 2 ('This
Constitution ... and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.'); see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
53 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). I am grateful to Robert
Destro for raising the analogy between the establishment of a bank and the establishment of a
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Clause, Congress could create and fund a national church if it felt that doing so
promoted the general welfare of the Country-regardless of any nexus to an
enumerated power.54 Nothing in the text of Article I, of course, mandates such a
broad reading of congressional power to regulate on the subject of religion.55
Nevertheless, prior to the adoption of the First and Tenth Amendments, these
kinds of religious regulations were textually plausible and arguably conformed
with early interpretations of Congress's express and implied powers.56
The fact that a reading is possible, however, does not necessarily make it the
most plausible interpretation of the original implied powers of Congress. For
example, those who proposed and ratified the original Constitution may have
considered the issue and expressly disavowed any intent to bring the subject of
religion within the reach of Congress. The text itself being ambiguous, the next
logical step would be to inquire into whether those who proposed and ratified the
original Constitution meant to include regulation of religion as one of various
means available for the pursuit of enumerated ends.
B. The Ratification Debates
In fact, the subject of religion came up in a variety of ways in the debates
over the proposed Constitution. For example, a number of Antifederalists
criticized the document for its lack of any religious test and its failure to
officially recognize the Deity.57 The criticism was not aimed, however, at adding
church. See Robert A. Destro, The Structure of the Religious Liberty Guarantee, 11 J.L. &
RELIGION 355, 358 (1995). In fact, a federal chaplaincy was established to serve the troops. See
infra note 235 and accompanying text. There is a possibility that the Religious Test Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("['No religious test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office or public Trust under the United States."), would have prevented the establishment of a
national church. Even here, however, Congress could have subsidized independent religious
contractors (local churches) and avoided the restrictions of the Clause (as was regularly done at
the time to provide educational instruction to the Native Americans, see infra notes 188-89 and
accompanying text). For a general discussion of the Test Clause, see Bradley, supra note 47.
54 In United States v. Butler, the Supreme Court adopted the Hamiltonian view that the
tax and spending power was not limited to those subjects enumerated in Article I, § 8, at least
in regard to non-coercive exercise of the tax and spending power. See 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
55 In fact, there is evidence that some of the founders objected to Marshall's broad reading
of the Necessary and Proper Clause. See Raoul Berger, The Founders' Views-According to
Jefferson Powell, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1067 (1989) (discussing Madison's criticism of
Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland).
56 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
57 See, e.g., Debate in Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan. 30, 1788) (statement of
Col. Jones), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, at 642, 643
("[R]ulers ought to believe in God or Christ... one of his principle objections was, the
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to the powers of Congress.58 Instead, the writers argued that, absent the moral
constraint of religious belief, federal officials would be free to follow their own
selfish ambitions.59 Similarly, without a provision protecting the rights of
conscience, those religiously scrupulous of bearing arms might be forced to serve
in the national military.60 The purpose, then, of calls to add a constitutional
acknowledgement of God and the rights of believers was to limit, not expand, the
potential reach of the federal government.61 Indeed, the most common objection
omission of a religious test."); see also Essay By Samuel, BOSTON INDEP. CHRON. &
UNIVERSAL ADVERITSER, Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted in 4 ThE COMPLETE ANT-FEDERALST,
supra note 48, at 191, 193 (lamenting the fact that, in the new Congress "a Pagan, a
Mahometan, a Bankrupt, may fill the highest seat, and any and every seat"); Debate in North
Carolina, supra note 46, at 89.
58 The author of the Essay by Samuel, supra note 57, at 195, criticizes the No Religious
Test Clause and asks whether a state can subsist without adopting some system of religion.
Although this could be read to imply that the author wanted Congress to have power over the
subject, "Samuel" himself criticizes only the lack of provisions acknowledging God. Id. at 196.
The Letter by David contains the clearest expression of Antifederalist support of government
regulation of religion. See Letter By David, MASS. GAzErrE, Mar. 7, 1788, reprinted in 4 Thm
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 48, at 246, 248 ("[lt is not more difficult to build an
elegant house without tools to work with, than it is to establish a durable government without
the publick protection of religion."). The letter, however, does not address the failures of the
federal Constitution. Instead, it is a reply to a previous letter published in defense of the
Constitution that called into question the general propriety of any government (state or federal)
support for religion. See id. In addressing the specific idea of religious tests for public office,
"David" repeats the common argument that religious tests act as a check on legislative activity.
See id. at 248 & 249 n.3 (citing the example of no-establishment, religiously tolerant Rhode
Island, where the legislators "have no principles of restraint"). Some pro-religion
Antifederalists exhorted the new Congress to "recommend" that the states pursue education.
See, e.g., Charles Turner, Speeches in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan. 17 and
Feb. 6, 1788), reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 48, at 217; see also
The Northwest Ordinance, I Stat. 50 (1789).
59 For example, Aristocrotis argued that, by failing to provide a religious test for public
office "the grand convention hath dexterously provided for the removal of every thing that hath
ever opperated [sic] as a restraint upon govemment in any place or age of the world."
Aristocrotis, The Government of Nature Delineated or An Exact Picture of the New Federal
Constitution (1788), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 48, at 196,
207.
60 See Essays of Philadelphiensis, PHiLADELPHIA INDEP. GAZETrEER, Nov. 1787-Apr.
1788, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 48, at 107 (arguing that
without a provision explicitly protecting the rights of conscience, Congress might force the
religiously scrupulous to bear arms).
61 Adding a religious test for office would not increase the powers of Congress any more
than the age requirements of Article I, § 2 implicates congressional power to control the
appropriate age for serving as a Representative. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("No person shall be
a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty-five Years ... "); see also
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in regard to congressional power and the subject of religion was that Congress
might attempt to regulate that subject as one of its express or implied
responsibilities. Some Antifederalists claimed that Congress might enforce
"religious orthodoxy" by way of its broad powers to tax and regulate the
military.62 These writers singled out the Necessary and Proper Clause as a
potential source of power to interfere with the rights of conscience-a right
expressly protected in state charters. 63 According to the pseudonymous writer
"An Old Whig":
[I]f a majority of the continental legislature should at any time think fit to
establish a form of religion, for the good people of this continent with all the
pains and penalties which in other countries are annexed to the establishment of
a national church, what is there in the proposed constitution to hinder their doing
so? Nothing; for we have no bill of rights, and every thing therefore is in their
power and at their discretion.64
The Federalists responded by arguing that the proposed Constitution granted
no power to Congress regarding the subject of religion-express or implied. In
the Virginia Ratifying Convention, James Madison declared that "[t]here is not
the shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with religion. Its
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
62 See Essays of An Old Whig, PHILADELPHIA INDEP. GAZETrER, Oct. 1787-Feb. 1788
[hereinafter Essays of An Old Whig], reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 48, at 17, 36.
63 See Letters From A Countryman, N.Y.J., Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in 6 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 48, at 69, 86-87 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause,
when read along side explicit prohibitions like the Ex Post Facto Clause, might be read to grant
power over all things not explicitly excepted, including the rights of conscience); see also I
ANNALS OF CONG. 455-57 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of James Madison); id. at 757
(statement of James Madison) (introducing religious liberty amendment on the grounds that
some people feared the Necessary and Proper Clause would provide an excuse to establish
religion).
64 See Essay of An Old Whig, supra note 62, at 37; see also Essay by Deliberator,
PHILADELPHIA FREEMAN'S J., Feb. 20, 1788, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 48, at 176, 179 (discussing Congress's ability under the General Welfare Clause to
establish a uniform national religion). Specifically, 'Deliberator" noted:
Congress may, if they shall think it for "the general welfare," establish an uniformity in
religion throughout the United States. Such establishments have been thought necessary,
and have accordingly taken place in almost all the other countries in the world, and will,
no doubt, be thought equally necessary in this.
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least interference with it, would be a most flagrant usurpation." 65 In the North
Carolina Ratifying Convention, James Iredell went even further:
Had Congress undertaken to guarantee religious freedom, or any particular
species of it, they would then have had a pretence to interfere in a subject they
have nothing to do with. Each state, so far as the clause in question does not
interfere, must be left to the operation of its own principles. 66
C. The Implications of "Losing"
Eventually, of course, Madison and the Federalists gave in to the calls for an
amendment expressly limiting federal power over free exercise and religious
establishments. This could be interpreted as a Federalist concession that the
original Constitution had, in fact, placed religion within the potential reach of
Congress's enumerated powers. For example, in his speech introducing the Bill
of Rights, Madison noted that "[i]t is true, the powers of the General
Government are circumscribed, they are directed to particular objects; but even if
Government keeps within those limits, it has certain discretionary powers with
respect to the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent .... 67
Madison, however, makes clear that he believes the amendments will help
prevent an abuse of power, not restrict the undesirable exercise of powers
legitimately granted.68 In fact, Madison never was convinced that the First
65 Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12, 1788) (statement of James Madison)
[hereinafter Madison, Virginia Ratifying Convention], reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTrruTION, supra note 46, at 88.
66 Debates in North Carolina, supra note 46, at 90 (statement of James Iredell). In this
section of Iredell's speech, he is explaining why the proposed constitution guarantees a
republican form of government, but does not guarantee religious liberty. See id. at 89-90.
Professor Akhil Amar has argued that this "Guarantee Clause" may imply a source of
congressional power to protect free speech within the states, even if there is no power directly
under the First Amendment. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican
Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO.
L. REV. 749 (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, Notes on the Establishment Clause].
Even if true, this still distinguishes the Free Speech Clause (which may be necessary to a
republican form of government) from the religion clauses as a legitimate subject of
congressional regulation.
67 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 456 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of James Madison).
68 See id. at 24. Madison commented:
But I will candidly acknowledge, that, over and above all these considerations, I do
conceive that the Constitution may be amended; that is to say, if all power is subject to
abuse, that then it is possible the abuse of the powers of the general Government may be
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Amendment was absolutely necessary.69 According to Madison, the original
Constitution had not granted the federal government any legitimate power-
express or implied-over subjects like speech and religion, and that the First
Amendment was added to make the Constitution "more explicit, and more safe
to the rights not meant to be delegated by it.' '70 According to Madison's 1800
Report on the Virginia Resolutions:
Without tracing farther the evidence on this subject, it would seem scarcely
possible to doubt that no power whatever over the press was supposed to be
delegated by the Constitution, as it originally stood, and that the amendment was
intended as a positive and absolute reservation of it.
... Both of these rights, the liberty of conscience and of the press, rest
equally on the original ground of not being delegated by the Constitution, and,
consequently, withheld from the Government Any construction, therefore, that
would attack this original security for the one must have the like effect on the
other.
... They are both equally secured by the supplement to the Constitution,
being both included in the same amendment, made at the same time, and by the
same authority. 7 1
Madison, at least, did not consider the addition of the Bill of Rights to be a
concession that the original document had in fact granted Congress any degree of
power over First Amendment subjects.
guarded against in a more secure manner than is now done ....
Id.; see also Proposed Amendments and Ratification 1789 [hereinafter Proposed
Amendments], reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrTUTION, supra note 46, at 40-41. The
Preamble to the Proposed Amendments contained the following language:
The conventions of a number of the states having, at the time of their adopting the
Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its
powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added; and as extending
the ground of public confidence in the government will best ensure the beneficent ends of
its institution.
Id.
69 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 757 (statement of James Madison) ("Whether the words [of
the religion clauses] are necessary or not, he did not mean to say... :).
70 James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800) [hereinafter Madison,
1800 Report], reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrUTION, supra note 46, at 141, 143.
71 Id. at 143, 146.
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D. Summary
It is possible to read the text of the original Constitution as granting
Congress implied power to regulate religion when doing so is necessary and
proper to advance an enumerated end.72 Certainly, the Antifederalists believed
that this was a plausible reading of the proposed Constitution-and this was one
reason they offered for rejecting it. Those defending the Constitution agreed that
granting federal power over religion would be a bad idea, but disagreed that the
Constitution contained even the "shadow of a right' to interfere on the subject
and that any such law would constitute an abuse of power. It seems, then, that if
implied power over religion was granted, it was granted by accident and despite
the intentions of everyone involved. For this reason alone, one might reject the
implied power theory on the ground that it is unreasonable to interpret the
original Constitution to contain a power deplored by the Constitution's enemies
and denied by the Constitution's friends.73 Nevertheless, even if not the most
plausible reading of the original text-as Madison himself conceded-it was
possible to read the original Constitution to contain such power. The issue, then,
is whether such power reasonably can be understood as having survived the
adoption of the Bill of Rights.
HI. TBE CASE FOR POWER AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
The first sentence of the First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."74 In terms of the religion clauses' effect on congressional power, there
are four possible interpretations: (1) the religion clauses grant Congress a degree
of discretionary power over the subject of religion, (2) the clauses have no effect
on power previously granted over the subject of religion, (3) the clauses limit
but do not completely preclude, the exercise of such power previously granted,
72 In fact, if one is convinced by Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v.
Maryland, this may be the most plausible reading of Congress's implied powers, even without
the Necessary and Proper Clause. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
73 During the period in which debates were raging over the adoption of the Bill of Rights,
the Virginia Senate issued a report reflecting its belief that even under the First Amendment,
Congress had power to "levy taxes" "for the support of religion or its preachers." See
BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 117. This report, however, was issued in an attempt to derail
ratification of the Bill of Rights. In other words, this criticism reflected widespread consensus
at the time of the Founding that, if such power existed, that was a reason to reject the
Constitution or amend it.
7 4 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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or (4) the clauses remove all congressional power over the subject of religion, or
(similarly) the clauses declare that the Constitution shall not be construed to
grant Congress any degree of power over the same.
The first possibility, that the First Amendment introduced power over the
subject of religion, is the least plausible. This interpretation is totally at odds with
the language of the amendment--"Congress shall make no law"--and would
contradict the reasons for introducing the First Amendment in the first place.75
The second possible interpretation, that the clauses had no effect on power over
religion previously granted, seems equally unlikely. The adoption of the First
Amendment was fueled by a concern at least to limit, if not remove altogether,
Congress's potential reach over the subject of religion.
The third view-that the amendment limits, but does not totally remove,
congressional power-is more reasonable. According to this view, the original
Constitution granted Congress some degree of implied power over religion, but
this power was somewhat circumscribed by the adoption of the First
Amendment. Under this "residual implied power" theory, Congress retained
some degree of implied power to regulate the subject of religion if (1) it was
doing so incident to an enumerated end, and (2) the regulation did not exceed the
(new) limitations of the First Amendment.
Some aspects of the religion clauses could be read as supporting the residual
implied power theory. For example, although the Establishment Clause prohibits
any law "respecting" an establishment, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits only
those laws which "prohibit" religious exercise. This wording might imply that,
although Congress has no power "respecting" religious establishments, Congress
may pass laws "respecting" free exercise, so long as the law does not "prohibit"
religious exercise. Under this view, the Free Exercise Clause would not itself
stand as the source of such power, but it would permit certain laws passed on
behalf of religious freedom. Thus, if the original Constitution granted Congress
some degree of implied power over religion, and if one reads the term "prohibit"
as indicating a lesser degree of restriction than the term "respecting," then it is
possible to arrive at a theory of residual implied power over the free exercise of
religion.
Additional evidence for the residual implied power view might also be
inferred from rejected drafts of the religion clauses. For example, Congress
75 According to James Madison in his speech introducing the Amendments to the House,
"the great object in view is to limit and qualify the powers of Government, by excepting out of
the grant of power those cases in which the Government ought not to act, or to act only in a
particular mode." 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 454 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of James
Madison). According to Leonard Levy, the conclusion that the First Amendment added to the
powers of Congress "is not only an impossible conclusion; it is ridiculous. Not one state would
have ratified such an enhancement of national authority." LEVY, supra note 17, at 141-42.
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briefly considered a version proposed by New Hampshire's Samuel Livermore
stating that "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the
rights of conscience. '76 Five days later, however, the House replaced this
proposed amendment with "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or
to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience," 77
which itself was rejected in favor of other proposals until Congress finally agreed
on the ultimate wording of the clauses. Because the "no laws touching religion"
language was rejected in favor of seemingly less restrictive language ("no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof'),
this could indicate an intent to only partially, not totally, disable Congress from
maling laws "touching religion."78
There are, however, a number of problems with this approach. First of all,
the language ultimately adopted is, arguably, more restrictive than Livermore's
proposal. As a number of scholars have pointed out,79 it is the "no law
respecting" language that uniquely protects state, as well as prohibiting federal,
religious establishments. This unique language is missing from Livermore's
proposal. Nor is it at all clear that Livermore's version would have completely
denied federal power to regulate free exercise in the states. If Congress was
prohibited from making any law "touching religion," this could be read to allow
a federal law also prohibiting state laws from "touching" religion.80 Most of all,
it is rather difficult to make an interpretative argument regarding the meaning of
the First Amendment, based on the rejection of a draft when there is no
surviving record of why the draft was rejected.81 It seems that the best we can do
76 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (statement of Samuel Livermore).
77 Id. at 796 (statement of Rep. Ames).
78 BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 92-96; see also SMrTH, supra note 17, at 31-33.
79 See SMnrH, supra note 17, at 22; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 101 YALE L.J. 1131, 1157 (1991); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the
Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085,
1091 (1996); William K. Leitzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and
the Rollback ofIncorporation, 39 DEPAULL. REV 1191, 1199 (1990).
80 Just as a provision preventing federal abridgment of free exercise, standing alone,
might allow federal laws preventing the states from abridging free exercise. This construction
was avoided by adding the (state protective) Establishment Clause and the Tenth Amendment
See infra.
81 Although there is no record of why Livermore's draft was rejected, proposing that its
rejection was motivated by an effort to retain some degree of federal power over the subject of
religion is rather startling, given the anti-federal power sentiment of the Antifederalists (who
called for the amendment) and the separationist views of men like James Madison (who
claimed no power had been granted in the first place). There is no evidence that the adoption or
rejection of any draft was motivated by a desire to retain some degree of federal power, and the
historical context in which the drafts were considered makes such a proposition extremely
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is consider what was adopted, and investigate what the Founders' had to say
about the text we ultimately received-which, after all, was the only text voted
on by those who ratified the document.
In fact, there are other textual clues in the First Amendment that seem to
point towards a complete denial of federal power.82 For example, of the original
Ten Amendments, only the First begins with the declaration "Congress shall
make no law." No other provision in the original Bill of Rights uses this
sweeping language of prohibition. Although amendments Two through Eight
address subjects clearly within Congress's enumerated powers,83 the First
Amendment does not. In fact, Madison himself distinguished the Bill's
protection of "positive rights," like "trial by jury,"84 from "natural rights," like
free speech. 85 Positive rights are limitations on the government's exercise of an
otherwise legitimate power.86 Natural rights like religion, speech, and the
press, 87 on the other hand, are declarative and exist whether expressly
enumerated or not-the protection of these rights in the Bill are added "merely
for greater caution." 88 Their enumeration in the First Amendment was merely
unlikely.
82 Professor Akhil Amar has discussed this aspect of the First Amendment in relation
with the rest of the Bill of Rights. See Amar, Notes on the Establishment Clause, supra note
66, at 9.
83 For example, the Second Amendment, U.S. CONsT. amend. II, limits powers
legitimately granted to Congress to "suppress insurrections" and to "provide for the organizing,
arming and disciplining the militia." Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15-16. The Third Amendment, id.
amend. M, limits the Executives power as commander in chief of the armed forces. See id. art.
II, § 2. Amendments Four through Eight limit the Executive's power to "take care that the laws
be faithfully executed" and the judiciary's power under Article lm. See id. art. I, § 3; id.
amend. IV-VIII. In particular, the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment, are
limitations on the exercise of otherwise legitimate congressional power to impose criminal
sanctions. See id, e.g., art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (conferring power "to provide for the punishment of
counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States"); id. art. I, § 8, c. 10
(conferring "power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas").
84 James Madison, Notes for Amendment Speech (1789), reprinted in THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 64
(Randy E. Bamett ed., 1989) ("[P]ositive rights result[ ]. As trial by jury.").
85 Id. ("[N]atural rights retained as speach [sic]."). See generally Randy E. Barnette,
Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L. REV. 745, 779-80 (1997) (discussing Madison's
distinction between "positive" and "natural" rights).
86 See supra note 84.
87 See Madison, 1800 Report, supra note 70, at 143, 146 (arguing that liberty of
conscience and freedom of the press were "declaratory rights" and were "equally and
completely exempted from all authority whatever of the United States").
88 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789); see also Proposed Amendments,
supra note 68, at 40. The Preamble clearly states:
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"precautionary," because there had been no intention to grant Congress power
over these subjects in the first place.89 In other words, to Madison, the First
Amendment does more than merely-and only partially-restrict previously
granted power; the language was a precautionary declaration that Congress has
The conventions of a number of the states having, at the time of their adopting the
Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its
powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added; and as extending
the ground of public confidence in the government will best ensure the beneficent ends of
its institution.
Id.
89 According to Madison:
When the Constitution was under the discussions which preceded its ratification, it is
well known that great apprehensions were expressed by many, lest the omission of some
positive exception, from the powers delegated, of certain rights, and of the freedom of the
press particularly, might expose them to the danger of being drawn, by construction,
within some of the powers vested in Congress, more especially of the power to make all
laws necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into execution. In reply to this
objection, it was invariably urged to be a fundamental and characteristic principle of the
Constitution, that all powers not given by it were reserved; that no powers were given
beyond those enumerated in the Constitution, and such as were fairly incident to them:
that the power over the rights in question, and particularly over the press, was neither
among the enumerated powers, nor incident to any of them; and consequently that an
exercise of any such power would be manifest usurpation....
From this posture of the subject resulted the interesting question, in so many of the
Conventions, whether the doubts and dangers ascribed to the Constitution should be
removed by any amendments previous to the ratification, or be postponed in confidence
that, as far as they might be proper, they would be introduced in the form provided by the
Constitution. The latter course was adopted; and in most of the States, ratifications were
followed by propositions and instructions for rendering the Constitution more explicit,
and more safe to the rights not meant to be delegated by it....
Without tracing farther the evidence on this subject, it would seem scarcely possible
to doubt that no power whatever over the press was supposed to be delegated by the
Constitution, as it originally stood, and that the amendment was intended as a positive and
absolute reservation of it....
... Both of these rights, the liberty of conscience and of the press, rest equally on the
original ground of not being delegated by the Constitution, and, consequently, withheld
from the Government. Any construction, therefore, that would attack this original security
for the one must have the like effect on the other.
... They are both equally secured by the supplement to the Constitution, being both
included in the same amendment, made at the same time, and by the same authority.
Madison, 1800 Report, supra note 70, at 143, 146.
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no power-express or implied-over these subjects in the first place.
When the First Amendment is read in conjunction with the Tenth, the textual
presumption against any degree of federal power over the subject of religion
becomes even stronger. The First Amendment declares that Congress "shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."90 The Tenth Amendment then declares that "the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."91 Since power to
establish religion and power to "prohibit free exercise" are denied to the federal
government, and nowhere prohibited to the states, 92 power to establish religion
and prohibit its free exercise is, literally, reserved to the states. And, as we shall
see in the next section, both Madison and Jefferson read the First Amendment in
conjunction with the Tenth.
A. Summary
The text of the First Amendment could be read merely to limit federal power
to prohibit free exercise, but not to prevent federal laws protecting free exercise.
Other aspects of the text, however, and particularly the text of the Tenth
Amendment, seem to point towards a complete denial of federal power over free
exercise and religious establishments. The words of prohibition in the First
Amendment are more restrictive than amendments Two through Eight, and
Founders like James Madison and Thomas Jefferson read these words as
declarative of preexisting constraints on federal power-as opposed to the
"positive rights" contained in the rest of the Bill of Rights. As declarations of
natural rights, the words expressed the idea that no power to make laws
"respecting" religious establishments or prohibiting free exercise had been
granted to Congress in the first place. Finally, the text of Tenth Amendment
literally reserves to the states power "to prohibit free exercise" and make laws
"respecting religious establishments." Thus a good argument can be made from
the text of the First and Tenth Amendments that all power over the subject of
religion was denied to the federal government and reserved to the states-
including the power to protect (indeed, power to prohibit) free exercise.
B. The Interpretation of the Founders
The text is not dispositive. As I pointed out at the beginning of the previous
90 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
91 Id. amend. X.
92 See Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 588 (1846).
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section, one could focus on the word "prohibit" in the Free Exercise Clause and
conclude that Congress could regulate the free exercise of religion as long as it
did not prohibit it. Although there are other textual indications that power over
the subject of free exercise was reserved to the states, either textual interpretation
is possible-if not equally plausible. Once again, we must turn to the views of
those involved in the framing, ratification, and early interpretation of the First
Amendment. However limited a role one reserves for evidence of original intent,
it surely would help to know the Founders' expectations regarding the effect of
the Bill of Rights on congressional power-to the extent those expectations can
be ascertained.93
In fact, there is a wealth of Founding-period commentary on the scope of
federal power over the subject of religion following the enactment of the religion
clauses. Thomas Jefferson, for example, read the First Amendment in
conjunction with the Tenth and concluded that the restrictions of the religion
clauses on the federal government were sweeping and comprehensive:
[I]t is true, as a general principle, and is also expressly declared by one of the
amendments to the Constitution, that "the powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
states respectively, or to the people;" and that, no power over the freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press, being delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, all lawful
powers respecting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the states,
or to the people;... [The Tenth Amendment] thus also [ ] guarded against all
abridgment, by the United States, of the freedom of religious principles and
exercises, and retained to themselves the right of protecting the same .... 94
Jefferson thus believed that, not only was all power over the subject of religion
denied the federal government, but also "all lawful powers respecting the
same"--including power to protect free exercise-was reserved to the states.
Similarly, in his Second Inaugural, Jefferson declared "[i]n matters of religion, I
have considered that its free exercise is placed by the constitution independent of
the powers of the general government." 95
93 Constitutional theorists as varied as Laurence Tribe, Ronald Dworkin, Antonin Scalia,
and Robert Bork all agree that the original intentions of the framers are at least helpful in
resolving the meaning of ambiguous constitutional texts. See generally A MATrER OF
INTERPRETATION (1997) (containing essays by Scalia, Amy Gutmann, Gordon Wood,
Laurence Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin). See also ROBERT BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143 (1990).
94 Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799 [hereinafter Kentucky
Resolutions], reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrLTION, supra note 46, at 131, 132.
95 Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (March 4, 1805) [hereinafter Jefferson,
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Jefferson was so convinced that the entire subject of free exercise was
removed from federal cognizance that he felt comfortable applying the uniquely
restrictive "respecting" language to both the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses. This not only appears in the above quote ("no power over the freedom
of religion ... all power respecting the same"), but also in his letters where he
wrote that he:
consider[ed] the government of the US. as interdicted by the Constitution from
intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or exercises.
This results not only from the provision that no law shall be made respecting the
establishment or free exercise, of religion, but from that also which reserves to
the states the powers not delegated to the U. S.96
James Madison agreed with Jefferson's comprehensive reading of the First
Amendment. As we have seen, during the debates over the proposed
Constitution, Madison argued "[t]here is not a shadow of right in the general
government to intermeddle with religion. Its least interference with it, would be a
most flagrant usurpation. ' 97 In his 1800 Report on the Virginia Resolutions,
Madison declared that "liberty of conscience and freedom of the press were
equally and completely exempted from all authority whatever of the United
States.' 98 Most significantly, Madison expressly rejected the idea that Congress
could regulate free exercise so long as it avoided making laws prohibiting free
exercise. During the Alien and Sedition Act debates, the Federalists compared
the First Amendment restriction on laws respecting religious establishments with
the seemingly lesser restriction on laws "abridging" freedom of speech and press.
Madison responded:
For if Congress may regulate the freedom of the press, provided they do not
Second Inaugural], reprinted in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS: 1789-1897, at 382 (James D. Richardson ed., 1899); see also Letter of Thomas
Jefferson to Reverend Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUrION, supra note 46, at 99 [hereinafter Jefferson/Miller Letter] ("[C]ivil powers alone
have been given to the President of the U.S. and no authority to direct the religious exercises of
his constituents.").
96 Jefferson/Miller Letter, supra note 95, at 98.
97 Madison, Virginia Ratifying Convention, supra note 65, at 88; see also James
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (June 20, 1785)
[hereinafter Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance], reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONsTruTION, supra note 46, at 82 ("[fIn matters of Religion, no man[']s right is abridged by
the institution of Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.").
98 Madison, 1800 Report, supra note 70, at 146; see also id. at 146-47; supra note 96 and
accompanying text (discussing whether the Free Exercise Clause, as opposed to the
Establishment Clause, grants some degree of congressional power).
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abridge it, because it is said only "they shall not abridge it," and is not said, "they
shall make no law respecting it," the analogy of reasoning is conclusive that
Congress may regulate and even abridge the free exercise of religion, provided
they do not prohibit it," and is not said, "they shall make no law respecting, or
no law abridging it" 99
Madison believed there was no difference in degree regarding the First
Amendment's constraints on religious establishments, free exercise, speech and
press: "the liberty of conscience and the freedom of the press were equally and
completely exempted from all authority whatever of the United States."10 0 Thus,
when Madison said Congress had no power over the freedom of religion, he
meant: no power to "prohibit," "abridge," "regulate," or do anything
"respecting" the free exercise of religion.
As advocates of the separation of church and state, Jefferson and Madison
might have been expected to take a narrow view of federal power over the
subject of religion.10 1 However, even those favorably disposed towards state
religious establishments interpreted the religion clauses to preclude federal
power over the subject of religion. For example, Joseph Story, who otherwise
believed that "Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state,"
nevertheless believed that, under the Constitution, "the whole power over the
subject of religion is left exclusively to the state governments, to be acted upon
according to their own sense of justice, and the state constitutions."'10 2
9 9 Madison, 1800 Report, supra note 70, at 146-47.
100 Id. at 146.
101 See Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan.l, 1802)
[hereinafter Jefferson/Danbury Baptist Letter], reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION,
supra note 46, at 96; Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia [hereinafter Jefferson,
Notes on Virginia], reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, at 79; James
Madison, Detached Memoranda [Madison, Detached Memoranda], reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, at 103; Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance,
supra note 97, at 82.
102 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 988, 992 (Carolina Academic Press reprint 1987) (1833) (emphasis added). Story's
conclusion that the federal govemment was denied all power over the subject of religion may
seem inconsistent with his arguments, made in the same section, in support of government
regulation of religion. See id. Story, however, was in favor of state support of religion and
disagreed with those seeking to disestablish religion in 1833 Massachusetts. See WILIAM G.
McLOUGHLiN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT (1971). Story thus rejected claims that the Founders
meant to express a principle of church-state relationships that should operate at the state, as
well as at the federal level. Thomas Cooley, in his 1868 treatise on state constitutions, adopts
Story's "no federal power" interpretation of the First Amendment religion clauses. See
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREAnSE ON THE CONSTIUTrONAL LIMIrATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATwE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 470 n.1 (1868); see also Ex
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The statements by other notable legal theorists of the time, although not as
clearly prohibitive of congressional power, follow the same pattern of denying
(instead of granting or permitting) federal power to regulate on the subject of
religion. In his treatise on Blackstone's Commentaries, St. George Tucker
declared:
Let no such monster be known there, [in the United States] as human authority
in matters of religion.... This inestimable and imprescriptable right is
guaranteed to the citizens of the United States, as such,... by that amendment to
the constitution of the United States, which prohibits congress from making any
law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.103
According to William Rawle in A View of the Constitution of the United States,
"[t]he first amendment prohibits congress from passing any law respecting an
establishment of religion, or preventng the free exercise of it. It would be
difficult to conceive on what possible construction of the Constitution such a
power could ever be claimed by congress." 104 These statements of Tucker and
Rawle are not as clearly prohibitive of federal power as are the statements we
considered above. On the other hand, nothing in their writing conflicts with the
express statements by Jefferson, Madison, and Story that Congress had no
legitimate power over the subject at all.10 5 In this regard, the testimony of the
Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 397-98 (1866) (Miller, J., dissenting) (adopting Story's
view of the "whole power over the subject of religion ... '.
103 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKsTONE'S COMMENTARiEs (1803), reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CoNITToN, supra note 46, at 96, 98 (quoting Richard Price, Of Liberty of
Conscience and Civil Establishment of Religion, 130 POLITICAL WRITINGS (1723-1791)).
Price was a famous dissenting Protestant clergyman in his day.
104 WILLIAM RAwLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1829), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSITION, supra note 46, at 106.
105 The First Amendment names Congress as the branch precluded from establishing a
religion or abridging the free exercise of religion. Although this might be interpreted as an
indication that the other two branches were free to do so, such an interpretation would
contradict the common understanding that the federal govemment as a whole was to have no
power to regulate religion. Professor Jay Bybee recently has pointed out that the
Representatives from the New England states had good reason to avoid a draft that might have
an adverse effect on the ability of federal courts to enforce state law when called upon to do so.
See Bybee, supra note 16, at 1560. For example, during the House debates over the drafting of
the religion clauses, Representative Huntington noted:
The ministers of their congregations to the Eastward were maintained by the contributions
of those who belonged to their society; the expense of building meeting-houses was
contributed in the same manner. These things were regulated by by-laws. If an action was
brought before a Federal Court on any of these cases, the person who had neglected to
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Founders is consistent and uncontroverted by those who played a major role in
the First Amendment's framing and ratification. 106
perform his engagements could not be compelled to do it; for a support of ministers or
building of places of worship might be construed into a religious establishment.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 758 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789); see also MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE
GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 22-23 (1967); Bybee, supra note 16, at 1561-62. Madison responded by pointing
out that the clause was intended only to prohibit national religious establishments and proposed
adding the "national" for that purpose. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 758 (statement of James
Madison). He withdrew his motion when Antifederalist Representatives objected that the term
"national" implied "consolidation of the states." Id. at 759. No one argued that federal courts
should be disabled from enforcing religious-based state law, and the final wording seems
perfectly suited to meet both Huntington's objections and Madison's interpretation of the
purpose of the clause: The First Amendment focuses attention on Congress and leaves the
federal courts free to enforce state law respecting religion. Understanding the Federalist
concerns that played a role in the drafting of the First Amendment also helps to explain later
judicial pronouncements on the subject of religion. In Vidal v. Girards' Executors, Justice
Story remarked that Christianity was part of the common law in "this qualified sense, that its
divine origin and truth are admitted, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled
and blasphemed against, to the annoyance of believers or the injury of the public." 43 U.S.
(How.) 127, 198 (1844) (emphasis added). Vidal was a case involving state law. Under the
Federalist reading of the First Amendment, it would be perfectly appropriate to refer to religion
as an integral aspect of state common law. In fact, Story cites to a Pennsylvania case in support
of his interpretation of the common law. See id. at 198.
Although the First Amendment also omits the Executive Branch, it is unlikely that this
reflects an intention to leave the President free to abridge free exercise and enforce laws
respecting an establishment of religion. More likely, Congress believed that including the
Executive was unnecessary in light of the congressional restriction. If there were no religious-
based laws to execute, there would be little opportunity for the President to exercise power over
the subject of religion. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 448-59 (statement of James Madison). Here
we must remember that the Executive in 1787 had far less power and was expected to play a
far more limited role in daily government decisionmaking, than the Presidency of today. See
JAMES W. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION: THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT 74 (1979). In fact,
the subject of executive power did come up during the ratification debates, and the defenders of
the Constitution rejected the idea that the President could establish a national religion by way
of his power to make treaties with foreign nations. See Debate in North Carolina, supra note
46, at 89-91. The symbolic acts of the Executive will be addressed below. Finally, whatever
the reasons for naming Congress and no other branch of the federal government, following its
adoption, the First Amendment was consistently interpreted as a restraint on federal power, not
just congressional power.
106 1 have found one example of an unsuccessful argument in favor of government power
over the subject of religion in the immediate post-adoption period. In 1811, James Madison
vetoed an Act of Congress to incorporate the Episcopal Church in what was then the District of
Columbia. See 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 983-84 (1811). Madison vetoed the Bill on the grounds
that it violated the Establishment Clause. See id. Objecting to member's requests for time to
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C. Denying Federal Power to Promote the Free Exercise ofReligion:
Federalism and the Concept of Toleration10 7
Presuming that Founders like Madison and Jefferson meant what they
said-that Congress has no power over the subject of religion-this seems to
collapse the restrictions of the religion clauses into a single proposition:
Congress has no power to address the subject of religion (either to prohibit or
promote). That proposition may seem so counterintuitive to the modem mind as
to render it presumptively erroneous. What possible reason would the Founders
have had to deny the federal government power to promote religious liberty as an
aspect of their enumerated powers?
The modem intuition that the federal government has some degree of power
to promote religious freedom, I believe, is entirely accurate if we are talking
about federal power post-1868.10 8 In 1791, however, there was good reason to
fear federal involvement even on behalf of the free exercise of religion.
Consider, for example, the Establishment Clause. There is a general consensus
among legal historians that at least one of the purposes of the Establishment
consider the matter, Mr. Wheaton declared that Madison's objections were "altogether futile."
Id. at 984. According to Wheaton, "if a bill for regulating the funds of a religious society could
be an infringement of the Constitution, the two Houses had so far infringed it by electing,
paying or contracting with their Chaplains; for so far as it established two different
denominations of religion." Id. The next day, the House voted against reconsidering the bill by
a vote of 29 in favor of reconsideration to 74 against. See id. at 997-98. To the extent that
Wheaton was arguing in favor of a general power over the subject of religion, he does not
expressly address the source of that power in regard to the Act or the practice of employing
chaplains. Moreover, his attempt to link the practice of congressional chaplains to a general
power to address the subject of religion failed to move his colleagues to reconsider the veto.
107 1 have argued elsewhere that many of the Founders were in favor of government
promotion and protection of majoritarian religion and religious culture. See Lash, supra note 3,
at 1118-22. Many of these same Founders, of course, also were in favor of a Federalist First
Amendment that denied federal power over the subject of religion. This highlights a deep
ambiguity in the federal Establishment Clause-supporting the adoption of the Establishment
Clause did not necessarily mean you were against govemment support of religion. As I point
out below, one's reasons for voting in favor of the amendment probably affected one's
interpretation of the scope of the amendment. If you were anti-federal government, but pro-
religion, you might be open to mere "symbolic acknowledgment of religion," and would make
sure that laws which were passed had minimal impact on the religious exercise of the majority.
Nevertheless, to the extent that I once believed that Congress openly asserted the power to
regulate religion as religion, I no longer believe that was the case. There were other ways to
pursue pro-religion policies without asserting such power. See infra Part IV (discussing, among
other things, religious education in territories, anti-polygamy legislation, thanksgiving
proclamations, etc.).
108 See ilfra Part V.
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Clause was to protect state religious establishments from federal interference. 10 9
However, if protecting state religious establishments was a special concern, then
there was just as much reason to deny federal power to "promote free exercise"
as there was to deny power over "an establishment of religion." Federal laws
protecting the free exercise of religion in the states, after all, could just as easily
interfere with state religious establishments as could a law "respecting an
establishment of religion."
In fact, at the time of the Founding, the very idea of "free exercise of
religion" was inextricably linked to the idea of state power to establish religion.
Consider, for example, James Iredell's curious statement in the North Carolina
Ratifying Convention that "[h]ad Congress undertaken to guaranty religious
freedom, or any particular species of it, they would then have had a pretense to
interfere in a subject they have nothing to do with." 10 This point had particular
bite in 1788. Free exercise at this time was an explicitly religious concept-and a
Protestant Christian one at that.111 State constitutions of the late eighteenth
10 9 See SMITH, supra note 17, at 22; Amar, supra note 79, at 1131 (1991); Akhil Reed
Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992)
[hereinafter Amar, Fourteenth Amendment]; Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of
the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1113 (1988); Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme
Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. 3, 12 (1949); Joseph M. Snee,
Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 389;
see also Lash, supra note 3.
110 See Debate in North Carolina, supra note 46, at 90. Here Iredell echoes Alexander
Hamilton in Federalist #84:
I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are
contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be
dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted; and,
on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more then were granted.
THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); see also James Wilson, Speech on the Federal
Constitution, reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
PUBLISHED DURING rrs DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 156-57 (Paul Leicester
Ford ed., B. Franklin reprint 1971) (1888) ("[A] formal declaration upon the subject [of
freedom of the press] ... might have been construed to imply that some degree of power was
given, since we undertook to define its extent.").
111 See ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOODY TENENT, OF PERSECUTION FOR CAUSE OF
CONSCIENCE (1644) ("An inforced uniformity of Religion throughout a Nation or civill state,
confounds the Civill and Religious, denies the principles of Christianity and civility, and that
Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh."); John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689),
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, at 52, 53 ('The care of souls
cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force; but
true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing
can be acceptable to God."); ISAAC BACKUS, A HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND: 1774-75,
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century commonly placed provisions protecting the "rights'of conscience" or the
"free exercise of religion" alongside of other provisions that limited public office
to members of a particular Christian denomination, authorized state support for
Christianity, or granted special favors to a particular Christian church. 112 Almost
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTI=rlON, supra note 46, at 65. Backus noted:
As the kingdom of Christ is not of this world, and religion is a concern between God and
the soul, with which no human authority can intermeddle, consistent with the principles of
Christianity, according to the dictates of Protestantism, we claim and expect the liberty of
worshipping God according to our consciences ....
Id.; see also THOMAS PANE, COMMON SENSE (Jan. 10, 1776), reprinted in 5 TiE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, at 69 ("For myself, I fully and conscientiously believe, this it is
the will of the Almighty, that there should be a diversity of religious opinions among us: it
affords a larger field for our Christian kindness."); Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance,
supra note 97, at 82. Madison noted:
It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as he
believes to be acceptable to him... Before any man can be considered as a member of
civil society, he must be considered as a subject of the Govemour of the Universe.
Id.; see also Act for Establishing Religious Freedom in Virginia (Oct. 3, 1875) (written by
Thomas Jefferson), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrtMON, supra note 46, at 84.
Jefferson wrote:
Whereas Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by
temporal punishments or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of
hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our
religion, who being lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by
coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do ....
Id. See generally Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1991); Hamburger, supra note 3.
112 See Delaware Declaration of Rights (1776) ("That all persons professing the Christian
religion ought forever to enjoy equal Rights and Privileges in this state."); MD. CONST.,
Declaration of Rights (1776) ("XXXII. [A]II persons, professing the Christian religion, are
equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty.... XXXV. That no other test or
qualification ought to be required, on admission to any office of trust or profit, than such oath
of support and fidelity to this state.... and a declaration of a belief in the Christian religion");
N.J. CONST. (1776) ("XVIII. That no person shall ever, within this colony, be deprived of the
inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his
own conscience... XIX That there shall be no establishment of any one religious sect in the
Province, in preference to another, and that no Protestant inhabitant of this colony shall be
denied the enjoyment of any civil right, merely on account of his religious principles; but that
all persons, professing a belief in the faith of any Protestant sect, who shall demean themselves
peaceably under the government, as hereby established, shall be capable of being elected into
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without exception, the extent of one's religious freedom depended upon how
closely one embraced orthodox Protestant Christianity.1 13
Free exercise in such a regime was known as "religious toleration."
"Tolerated" religions were free only to the extent that they did not threaten the
established religion of the state. 14 For example, most state constitutions in the
late eighteenth century included a "proviso" following the Religious Freedom
any office of profit or trust, or being a member of either branch of the Legislature."); N.C.
CoNsT. (1776) ("XIX. That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences .... XXXII. That no person who shall
deny the being of God or the truth of the Protestant religion, or the divine authority either of the
Old or New Testaments, or who shall hold religious principles incompatible with the freedom
and safety of the State, shall be capable of holding any office or place of trust or profit in the
civil department within this state."); S.C. CONST. (1778) ("CXVIII. That all persons and
religious societies who acknowledge that there is one God, and a future state of rewards and
punishments, and that God is publicly to be worshipped, shall be freely tolerated. The Christian
Protestant religion shall be deemed, and is hereby constituted and declared to be, the
established religion of this State. That all denominations of Christian Protestants in this state,
demeaning themselves peaceably and faithfully, shall enjoy equal religious and civil
privileges."); MASS. CONST. (1780) ("And every denomination of Christians, demeaning
themselves peaceably and as good subjects of the commonwealth, shall be equally under the
protection of the law."); N.H. CONST. (1784) ("V. Every individual has a natural and
unalienable right to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
reason.... VI .... Provided notwithstanding... And every denomination of Christians
demeaning themselves quietly, and as good subjects of the state, shall be equally under the
protection of the law."); VT. CONST. (1786) ('That all men have a natural and unalienable right
to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and
understandings .... Nevertheless, every sect or denomination of Christians ought to observe
the Sabbath or Lord's day, and keep up some sort of religious worship, which to them shall
seem most agreeable to the revealed will of God.").
113 See state constitutional provisions cited supra note 112. Even when the state
constitution did not itself limit religious freedom to certain faiths, state courts lifiiited the public
expression of disbelief. See, e.g., People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. Cas. 290 (N.Y. 1811) (upholding
a blasphemy conviction under state common law). Chancellor Kent noted "that the case
assumes that we are a christian people, and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted upon
christianity ... ." Id. at 294.
114 Thomas Paine made essentially the same argument in his Rights ofMan:
Toleration is not the opposite of intoleration, but is the counterfeit of it. Both are
despotisms. The one assumes to itself the right of withholding liberty of conscience, and
the other of granting it. The one is the Pope, armed with fire and faggot, and the other is
the Pope selling or granting indulgences. The former is church and state, and the other is
church and traffic.
THOMAS PAINE, RIGIHTS OF MAN (1791), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTIUTION, supra
note 46, at 95. To Paine, the rights of conscience should be equal and "universal," and this was
possible only where civil government relinquished its power to establish an official religion.
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Clause indicating that the "freedom granted herein" should not be construed to
permit acts of "licentiousness" or breaches of the peace.115 There is some
question whether these provisos implied a degree of free exercise protection
against otherwise generally applicable law.116 What is clear, however, is that the
scope of religious freedom under these provisos was, in part, a function of one's
religious beliefs. 117 In practice, the "equal rights of conscience" might be granted
to non-Christian groups that were sufficiently non-threatening to Protestant belief
and mores (in some cases, Judaism), but denied to "subversive" Christian sects
(for example, Roman Catholics).118
In addition to suppressing subversive dissenting beliefs, most states took an
active role in promoting and protecting the religious exercise of the Protestant
majority."19 In many instances, churches and ministers were subsidized through
115 See generally Hamburger, supra note 3, at 918 (listing and discussing the meaning of
the "caveats" in state constitutional provisions protecting religious liberty).
116 Professor Michael McConnell argues that, were it not for an implied exemption of
religious motivated conduct from generally applicable law, there would be no reason to add the
provisos (exemptions are limited to those laws that do not implicate the peace or safety of the
state). See McConnell, supra note 3, at 1462 ("The 'peace and safety' clauses identify a
narrower subcategory of the general laws; the free exercise provisions would exempt
religiously motivated conduct from these laws up to the point that such conduct breached
public peace and safety."). But see Hamburger, supra note 3, at 921 (arguing that these
provisos "set forth the conditions under which government could deny a promised religious
liberty").
117 See Ruggles, 8 Johns. Cas. at 297 (affirming a blasphemy conviction under state
common law); Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 398 (Pa. 1824)
(upholding conviction under 1700 blasphemy statute which prohibited speech that willfully
profaned "Almighty God, Christ Jesus, the Holy Spirit, or the Scriptures of Truth").
118 Under the New York Constitution of 1777, for example, Jews were allowed to hold
office, but not Roman Catholics. Under Maryland's Constitution of 1776, Catholics could hold
office, but Jews could not. See generally MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS AND INFIDELS 13
(1984).
119 Many state constitutions expressly singled out Protestant Christians as the focus of the
religious liberty provisions. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. (1776) ("XIX. That there shall be no
establishment of any one religious sect in the Province, in preference to another, and that no
Protestant inhabitant of this colony shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil right, merely on
account of his religious principles; but that all persons, professing a belief in the faith of any
Protestant sect, who shall demean themselves peaceably under the govemment, as hereby
established, shall be capable of being elected into any office of profit or trust, or being a member of
either branch of the Legislature .... '); N.C. CONSr. (1776) ("XXXII. That no person who shall
deny the being of God or the truth of the Protestant religion, or the divine authority either of the Old
or New Testaments, or who shall hold religious principles incompatible with the freedom and safety
of the State, shall be capable of holding any office or place of trust or profit in the civil department
within this state.'); S.C. CONST. (1778) ("XXXVIII. The Christian Protestant religion shall be
deemed, and is hereby constituted and declared to be, the established religion of this State. That
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local tax assessments and were themselves generally exempt from property and
import taxes.1 20 Certain religious groups traditionally opposed to bearing arms
were exempted from military service,121 and Christian religious scruples were
protected from forced oaths at trial.122 Not surprisingly, atheistic scruples were
not similarly protected.' 23 Public disputes regarding the Trinity were allowed;
public challenges to the divinity of Jesus Christ were not.124 Thus, through a
combination of positive support, legal exemptions, and official patrolling of
public religious expression, most states "regulated religion" in a manner that
provide just enough "free exercise" of dissenting religions to avoid recreating
Europe's internecine strife on American soil.12 5 By tolerating "dissenting"
religious groups to some degree, state legislatures could regulate the subject of
religion and, at the same time, plausibly maintain that such regulations did not
amount to the hated "religious establishment" of Anglican England.126
all denominations of Christian Protestants in this state, demeaning themselves peaceably and
faithfully, shall enjoy equal religious and civil privileges."); Ruggles, 8 Johns. Cas. at 292-97
(upholding state legal protections designed to suppress blasphemy).
120 See BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 22-24 (discussing religious tax assessments in New
England).
121 See McConnell, supra note 3, at 1468 (discussing militia exemptions in the states at
the time of the Founding).
122 See id. at 1467.
123 See Ruggles, 8 Johns. Cas. at 290; Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle
394 (Pa. 1824); see also BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 22 (discussing blasphemy laws in New
England).
124 For example, the New York Constitution in 1811 declared that "the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, should
forever thereafter be allowed within this state, to all mankind." N.Y. CoNST. (1811). This
provision did not prevent Chancellor Kent from upholding a common law blasphemy
conviction against a defendant who publicly declared, "Jesus Christ was a bastard and his
mother must be a whore." See Ruggles, 8 Johns. Cas. at 293.
125 See Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1559, 1671 (1989); see also Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the
Threat to Religious Liberty: The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MNN.
L. REV. 1047 (1996) (advocating that the religion clauses' historical context cannot be
divorced from the Founders' experiences with religious strife arising out of the Reformation).
The writings of the Founders are filled with references to the bloody religious wars across the
sea. See, e.g., Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, supra note 101, at 79 (discussing the religious
persecution in Europe as one cause of the immigration to America). Accordingly, it was good
public policy that, to the extent practicable in a Christian society, Protestant religious exercise
should not be compelled or restrained.
126 See generally BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 24; Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 2361
(arguing that the purpose of the Establishment Clause "was to bar Congress from tampering
with state religion laws").
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Against this backdrop of state promotion of Protestant Christianity, it is
understandable why Iredell would argue against placing the subject of free
exercise in the proposed Constitution. Power to promote free exercise was itself
power to promote religious orthodoxy. Adding a provision on the subject of
religious liberty might give Congress an excuse to "protect free exercise" in the
states; for example, by forbidding certain state religious establishments on the
quite plausible grounds that such establishments abridged the "free exercise" of
"true religion."'127 Thus, adopting something like the Free Exercise Clause-
echoing provisions common in state constitutions-arguably created the need to
add an additional clause forbidding any "law respecting an establishment of
religion"--wording unheard of on a state level-and is clearly protective of state
establishments. 128 And both clauses made necessary the addition of the Tenth
Amendment in order to ensure that Congress was given no excuse to adventure
in free exercise protectionism: it was the states, not the federal government, who
had the exclusive responsibility to protect or prohibit the free exercise of
majoritarian religion. As Jefferson put it:
[A]U lawful powers respecting [religion, speech, and press] ... were reserved to
the states, or to the people; that thus was manifested their determination to retain
to themselves the right of judging how far the licentiousness of speech, and of
the press, may be abridged without lessening their useful freedom, and how far
those abuses which cannot be separated from their use, should be tolerated rather
127 Likewise, the power to regulate (and protect) interstate commerce gave Congress
power to trump state laws that interfered with the same. See also Wilson, supra note 110, at
157 ("[A] formal declaration upon the subject [of freedom of the press] ... might have been
construed to imply that some degree of power was given, since we undertook to define its
extent."). Interestingly, in the 1850s, a proposed treaty protecting the religious rights of United
States citizens overseas raised the concern that this might imply congressional power to
guarantee religious liberty in the several states. See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
128 Even with this language, there were still those who insisted that the new constitution
granted Congress power to regulate religion. See, for example, the Virginia Senate's critique of
the proposed Bill of Rights, supra note 73 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding the
religion clauses Congress might:
levy taxes in any amount, for the support of religion or its preachers; and any particular
denomination of Christians might be so favored and supported by the General
Govenment as to give it a decided advantage over others, and in the process of time
render it as powerful and dangerous as if it were established as the national religion of the
country.
Id. Again, this interpretation was offered as a reason to reject the proposed Constitution.
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than the use be destroyed .... 129
This explains why the two clauses were so often collapsed, or paraphrased,
in the writings and speeches of the Founders. 130 To them, there was no critical
distinction between the words of restriction in the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause: together (and especially when viewed alongside the Tenth
Amendment) they expressed a principle of federalism-these subjects were
beyond federal cognizance and exclusively reserved to the states. As Daniel
Carroll put it in the House debates over the religion clauses: "As the rights of
conscience are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the
gentlest touch of governmental hand; .... He would not contend with gentlemen
about phraseology, his object was to secure the substance in such a manner as to
satisfy the wishes of the honest part of the community."'131
D. Federalism and the Alien and Sedition Act Debates
Just a few years after the adoption of the First Amendment, the issue of
federal power over First Amendment subjects arose during the debates over the
Alien and Sedition Acts. 132 The Federalist Party argued that the federal
government had power to regulate speech and press when doing so was incident
to an enumerated power-in this case, power to prevent insurrections. 133
129 Kentucky Resolutions, supra note 94, at 132.
130 See, e.g., id. at 132; Jefferson/Miller Letter, supra note 95, at 98; Madison, 1800
Report, supra note 70. Other have taken notice of this tendency. See LEONARD W. LEVY,
ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONsTrTUTION 179-80 (1988); Bybee, supra note 16, at
1563-64 n. 114. Even the famous religious dissenter Isaac Backus, in two editions of his book
on New England History, badly misquoted the religion clauses due to his mistaken impression
that Congress had adopted a version proposed (and rejected) early in the debates. See ISAAC
BACKUS, 2 HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND 341 (1795) (David Weston, ed. 1871); ISAAC BACKUS,
AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE CHURCH HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND 225 (1804). The version quoted
by Backus read "Congress shall make no law, establishing articles of faith, or a mode of
worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion." See WILIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, 2 NEW
ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630-1833, at 783 (1971); see also ANSON PHELPS STOKES, 2 CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (1950) (statement of Rep. Richard H. Johnson to the
House of Representatives on Mar. 4, 1830) ("... Congress shall pass no law respecting an
establishing of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.").
131 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 757-58 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Daniel Carroll).
132 Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596.
133 See James Madison, Address of the General Assembly to the People of the
Commonwealth of Virginia (Jan. 23, 1799) [hereinafter Madison, Address to the General
Assembly], reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, at 139-40; see also
John Marshall, Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 22, 1799) [hereinafter
Marshall, Minority Report], reprinted in 5 FOUNDERS' CONSTrTUION, supra note 46, at 136-
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Because seditious libel was punishable at common law, and because the Acts-
unlike the common law-allowed truth as a defense, the Alien and Sedition Acts
had not "abridged" the freedom of speech or press and therefore were in
compliance with the First Amendment. 134 According to the author135 of the
Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions:
In a solemn instrument, as is a constitution, words are well weighed and
considered before they are adopted. A remarkable diversity of expression is not
used, unless it be designed to manifest a difference of intention. Congress is
prohibited from making any law RESPECTING a religious establishment but not
from making any law RESPECTING the press. When the power of Congress
relative to the press is to be limited, the word RESPECTING is dropt, and Congress
is only restrained from the passing any law ABRIDGING its liberty. This
difference of expression with respect to religion and the press, manifests a
difference of intention with respect to the power of the national legislature over
those subjects, both in the person who drew, and in those who adopted the
amendment. 1
3 6
Notice the kind of argument advanced by the Federalists: First, it assumes that
the original Constitution allowed Congress to regulate a First Amendment
subject when doing so was incident to an enumerated power. Secondly, it reads
the terms of restriction in the First Amendment as containing varying degrees of
prohibition: the "respecting" language is an absolute prohibition on laws
"respecting" religious establishments, but the term "abridge" is read to allow
federal regulation of the subject of speech and press, so long as they are not
"abridged." This is, in other words, the residual implied power theory applied to
the Speech and Press Clause.
As we saw in the previous section, Madison and Jefferson rejected every
prong of the residual implied power theory as applied to any First Amendment
subject. The original Constitution had not granted the federal government any
power, express or implied, over subjects like religion, speech, and press. The
words of the First Amendment were never meant to be parsed into varying
38 (noting that "[t]o contend that there does not exist a power to punish writings coming within
the description of this law, would be to assert the inability of our nation to preserve its own
peace....").
134 See Marshall, Minority Report, supra note 133, at 138 ("All ABRIDGMENT of the
freedom of the press is forbidden, but it is only an ABRIDGEMENT of that freedom which is
forbidden.").
135 The Founders' Constitution names John Marshall as the author of the Minority
Report. See id at 136. Jean Edward Smith, in his recent biography, see JEAN EDWARD SMITH,
JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION (1996), disputes this claim.
136 Marshall, Minority Report, supra note 133, at 138.
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degrees of restriction. The same absolute restriction that applied to religious
establishments applied to free exercise, speech, and press: no law could be made
"respecting" any of these subjects. Finally, the Tenth Amendment reserved "all
lawful power" over these subjects to the states-including the power to protect
these liberties.
All of these points were presented earlier, but it is important to specifically
address how the context in which these arguments were made makes them as
applicable to a situation in which Congress seeks to promote religion or speech,
as they were applicable in a situation in which Congress seemed to be abridging
speech and press. We are used to thinking about the Alien and Sedition Acts as
having abridged individual liberty. In fact, during the debates, Madison argued
that the Acts did abridge individual freedom: he disagreed with the Federalists
that the common law ought to be the standard for freedom of the press, and he
also argued that the Acts violated the "right of freely examining public characters
and measures and free communication... has [ I been justly deemed the only
effectual guardian of every other right."137
But modem notions of individual liberty cannot obscure what was to
Madison and Jefferson the central problem with the Acts: they violated the rights
of the states. Listen to the opening words of the Kentucky Resolutions:
1. Resolved, That the several states composing the United States of America
are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general
government but that, by compact, under the style and title of a Constitution for
the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general
government for special purposes, delegated to that government certain definite
powers, reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of right to their own
self-goverment.138
Likewise, James Madison, in his Address to the Virginia Assembly
regarding the Alien and Sedition Acts, begins his argument by declaring the Acts
a violation of state sovereignty:
The sedition act presents a scene which was never expected by the early
friends of the Constitution. It was then admitted that the State sovereignties were
only diminished by powers specifically enumerated, or necessary to carry the
specified powers into effect Now Federal authority is deduced from implication;
and from the existence of State law [regarding libel], it is inferred that Congress
possess[es] a similar power of legislation; whence Congress will be endowed
with a power of legislation in all cases whatsoever, and the States will be
stripped of every right reserved, by the concurrent claims of a paramount
137 Madison, 1800 Report, supra note 70, at 144.
138 Kentucky Resolutions, supra note 94, at 131.
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Legislature.
The sedition act is the offspring of these tremendous pretensions, which
inflict a death-wound on the sovereignty of the States. 139
This declaration that the Alien and Sedition Acts abridged the sovereignty of
the states is all the more remarkable when one considers that the Acts did not
interfere in any way with state laws on the subject of seditious libel. The problem
was with the assertion of a concurrent power to regulate a subject meant to be
completely removed from federal cognizance. Madison rejected the claim that
the laws did not abridge the freedom of speech and press, 140 but his central claim
was that it did not matter: the problem was not so much whether the law
abridged the freedom of speech and press, which was arguable, but that Congress
had addressed a subject beyond their reach. Worse, any construction that allowed
Congress the power to address the subjects of speech and press-so long as they
were not abridged, would also give Congress power to address the subject of free
exercise-so long as it was not prohibited.141
Madison's argument fails if the First Amendment allowed benevolent
federal laws respecting First Amendment subjects. If benevolent laws could be
made on the subject of press (or religion), this would be possible only because
any law-incident to an enumerated power-could be made on that subject, so
long as the law avoiding "abridging" the press or "prohibiting" free exercise.
That is why Jefferson's and Madison's language is so sweeping and unequivocal:
"the liberty of conscience and the freedom of the press were equally and
completely exempted from all authority whatever of the United States."'142 To try
and make these words mean less than what they clearly say-to treat them as
139 Madison, Address to the General Assembly, supra note 133, at 139 (emphasis added).
140 See Madison, 1800 Report, supra note 70, at 142-43.
141 Madison noted:
Both of these rights, the liberty of conscience and of the press, rest equally on the original
ground of not being delegated by the Constitution, and, consequently, withheld from the
Government. Any construction, therefore, that would attack this original security for the
one must have the like effect on the other.
... They are both equally secured by the supplement to the Constitution, being both
included in the same amendment, made at the same time, and by the same authority. Any
construction or argument, then, which would turn the amendment into a grant or
acknowledgment of power with respect to the press, might equally be applied to the
freedom of religion.
Id. at 146.
142 Id. (emphasis in original).
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hyperbole-would be to unravel Madison's lead argument. 143
Viewing the Alien and Sedition Acts debates as limited to the context of
federal abridgment of individual liberty misses the states' rights core of
Madison's and Jefferson's argument: any attempt to enforce a national rule
regarding religion, speech, or press would violate the reserved right of the states
to regulate these subjects, including the "right of protecting the same." When
viewed in a states' rights context, it makes sense that Jefferson and Madison
would use phrases like "no power granted" and "all lawful powers reserved."
This same states' rights context helps us understand Jefferson's declaration in his
Second Inaugural that "free exercise is placed by the constitution independent of
the powers of the general government,"'144 and Joseph Story's explanation in his
commentaries that "the whole power over the subject of religion is left
exclusively to the state governments, to be acted upon according to their own
sense ofjustice, and the state constitutions." 145
E. The Free Exercise Clause as a Mandate to Exempt Religion From
Federal Law in Order to Prevent Its Abridgment
Even if the adoption of the First Amendment was intended to prevent
Congress from exercising implied power over the subject of religion, it is
nevertheless possible to read the Free Exercise Clause as permitting-or
requiring-Congress to tailor its laws in such a way as to avoid unnecessary
abridgment of religious exercise. Under this reading of the Free Exercise Clause,
143 As I pointed out above, both the Kentucky Resolutions (Jefferson), and the 1800
Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Madison) lead with the state sovereignty argument.
Madison's Report next explains why the Federalists are wrong to use the common law as a
standard for freedom of speech and press. He then introduces the subject that will take up
several pages of text:
Whatever weight may be allowed to these considerations [regarding the common
law], the committee do not, however, by any means intend to rest the question on them.
They contend that the article of amendment, instead of supposing in Congress a power
that might be exercised over the press, provided its freedom was not abridged, was meant
as a positive denial to Congress of any power whatever on the subject.
Madison, 1800 Report, supra note 70, at 143.
144 See Jefferson, Second Inaugural, supra note 95.
145 STORY, supra note 102, at §§ 988, 992. Thomas Cooley, in his 1868 treatise on state
constitutions, adopts Story's "no federal power" interpretation of the First Amendment religion
clauses. See COOLEY, supra note 102, at 470 n.1; see also Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333, 397-98 (1866) (Miller, J., dissenting) (adopting Story's view of the "whole power over
the subject of religion").
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Congress would have an implied option-or obligation, depending on how one
reads the Free Exercise Clause-of accommodating religion even as Congress
exercises one of its enumerated powers.
A weak form of this approach would mean simply that Congress has within
its discretion, when choosing among legislative options religiously neutral on
their face, the ability to choose the option with the least impact on religion. This,
however, would not result in Congress passing a law addressing the subject of
religion, much less constitute a law based on a power relating to religion.146
A stronger form would read the Free Exercise Clause to permit-or
require-Congress to carve out an express religious exemption from an
otherwise generally applicable statute, if that statute threatened to abridge
religious exercise. Note that, under this view, Congress would have no power to
interfere with state regulation of religion; the obligation would address only
federal statutes based on separately enumerated powers which themselves
threatened to abridge religious exercise.147 In other words, this approach would
not allow Congress to regulate religion as a means to advance an enumerated
end.
The text itself is ambiguous in regard to religious exemptions-discretionary
or mandated. Nor does the historical evidence we have reviewed so far help
resolve the issue. There are numerous examples of Founders describing the
religion clauses as removing the subject of religion, including the subject of free
exercise, from congressional control. However, the Founders may not have
considered granting an exemption from an otherwise valid federal law to
constitute an exercise of power over the subject of religion. Instead, they may
have viewed such exemptions as a refusal to extend federal power over
religiously motivated conduct.148
The Founders never expressly addressed the subject of religious exemptions
from otherwise generally applicable federal laws. This may be due to the fact
that, given the limited role Congress was expected to play in regulating matters
potentially affecting religious liberty, there was little reason to consider the need
for religious exemptions. Thus, given the context in which it was enacted, it is
14 6 If the law has no plausible secular purpose, then even if formally neutral on the
subject of religion, it would count as covert regulation on the subject of religion and should be
subject to a religious gerrymandering analysis. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
147 Presumably, the same power also would exist to carve out exemptions for religion in
order to avoid making a law "respecting an establishment." One could, however, read the
language of the Establishment Clause as implying a greater restriction on Congress.
1481 will address the implications of post-First Amendment exemptions in the next
section. See infra Part IV.
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possible that the Free Exercise Clause-as of 1791-addressed legislation on the
subject of religion, not legislation merely having an impact on religion.1 49
F. The Failed Militia Exemption Amendment
During the House debates, Madison proposed adding language to the Second
Amendment that would expressly exempt religious objectors from military
service. 150 Madison's proposal was passed in the House, but failed in the Senate.
Although there is no clearly recorded reason for the rejection, some members of
Congress expressed the view that questions regarding conscientious objectors
should be left to the discretion of the "Government 151 or the "legislature."' 52
149 But see McConnell, supra note 3. McConnell bases his argument on plausible
interpretations of state free exercise provisions, viewing them as likely models for the federal
clause, and on the religious commitments of framers like James Madison. Id. Elsewhere, I have
argued that the evidence does not support McConnell's conclusions regarding the original
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. See Lash, supra note 3; see also Hamburger, supra note
3. In any event, I am not aware of a single example of a Founder expressly interpreting the Free
Exercise Clause to require-or even permit-an exemption from a generally applicable law.
150 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of James Madison)
("[N]o person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military
service in person."). The Select Committee modified this to "no person religiously scrupulous
shall be compelled to bear arms." Id. at 778 (statement of Chairman Boudinot).
151 See id. at 780 (statement of Rep. Egbert Benson) ('It may be a religious persuasion,
but it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the discretion of the Govemment").
Benson's full remarks are as follows:
Mr. Benson moved to have the words "but no person religiously scrupulous shall be
compelled to bear arms," struck out. He would always leave it to the benevolence of the
Legislature, for, modify it as you please, it will be impossible to express it in such a
manner as to clear it from ambiguity. No man can claim this indulgence of right. It may be
a religious persuasion, but it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the
discretion of the Government. If this stands part of the Constitution, it will be a question
before the Judiciary on every regulation you make with respect to the organization of the
militia, whether it comports with the declaration or not It is extremely injudicious to
intermix matters of doubt with fundamentals.
I have no reason to believe but the Legislature will always possess humanity enough
to indulge this class of citizens in a matter they are so desirous of; but they ought to be left
to their discretion.
Id. at 779-80.
152 See id. at 796 (objection of Rep. Thomas Scott) (stating that exemptions were "a
legislative right altogether"). See generally McConnell, supra note 3, at 1500-03 nnA65--81
(documenting the arguments advanced by supporters and detractors of the "Militia Exemption
Clause"). There is no indication that anyone thought that adding such an amendment to the
Constitution might give Congress an excuse to involve itself in religious matters. This may be
1112 [Vol. 59:1069
POWER AND THE SUBJECT OF RELIGION
These members did not specify whether they were referring to the legislatures of
the states or the federal Congress. If they were referring to the discretion of the
federal government, then these remarks would be evidence that some members
of Congress believed that they had power to enact religious exemptions from
generally applicable law-even in the absence of a constitutional mandate. 153
In fact, there is reason to believe these remarks referred to the discretion of
state government to exempt religious objectors. The proposed religious
exemption was to be added to what is now the Second Amendment-an
amendment explicitly referring to state militias.154 States had the primary
responsibility to recruit and train militias-which Congress could then call forth
"to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrection, and repel
Invasions." 15 5 At the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, states were
responsible for meeting federal quotas for troops; the decision whether to grant a
religious exemption was in the hands of the state legislatures who, in fact, had
different policies. 15 6 Until well into the next century, Congress itself made no
due to the fact that the proposed amendment addressed an extremely narrow subject. There was
little chance a provision regarding conscientious objectors could be read as a broader grant of
federal power over religion. Of course, to the extent that some members harbored such
concerns, this was another reason to vote against the proposed amendment which, after all,
failed.
153 Professor Michael McConnell has written that congressional consideration of militia
exemptions indicates that such exemptions were considered by many to be an appropriate
means of protecting the religious conscience. See McConnell, supra note 3, at 1500.
McConnell also believes that the rejection of the proposal does not necessarily mean that the
Founders believed that the First Amendment would not itself occasionally require exemptions
from generally applicable (federal) law. See id. at 1500-03.
154 U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.").
155 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15-16. At the time of the adoption of the First Amendment, there was
no federal conscription. During the revolution, the Continental Army was comprised of paid
volunteers, so self selection obviated the need for exemptions. Towards the end of the war, as
volunteers became scarce, states initiated their own drafts with their own individual systems of
exemption. See JOHN WHrrECLAY CHAMBERS III, To RAISE AN ARMY: THE DRAFr COMES TO
MODERN AMERICA 21 (1987). One year after the Bill of Rights was ratified, Congress enacted
the Uniform Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (1792). Under this Act, all males age 18-
45 were to enroll in their state militia. See id. The Act further states: "all persons who now are
or may hereafter be exempted by the laws of the respective states, shall be, and are hereby
exempted from militia duty...." See id. This approach tracks the theory underlying the First
and Tenth Amendments that regulation of religion-including religious exemptions from the
military-was a subject best left to the states.
156 See, e.g., Uniform Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271-72 (1792). It states:
Section I ... every free able-bedied white male citizen of the respective states, resident
therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five
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law respecting conscientious objectors; there was no federal conscription.' 57
Thus, for the first one hundred years of the Constitution, it was the governments
of the several states that exercised discretion over the issue of religious
exemptions from military service. In light of the historical practice in place at the
time of these debates-a practice that would not change for the next several
decades-it seems most reasonable to interpret these comments as referring to
the discretion of the states, not the federal government. 158
Not only is there no clear evidence of Founding support for federal religious
exemptions, the context in which the First Amendment was enacted seems to cut
against any intention to grant Congress the power to enact religious exemptions.
Discretionary religious-based exemptions mandated at a federal level would
have triggered all of the Antifederalist concerns raised in the previous section.
The Antifederalists, after all, wished to avoid giving the federal government any
excuse to regulate religion. Thus, it makes sense that, originally, religious
exemptions from the militia were not made a federal matter; each state was
allowed to enact its own policy.159 Even those members of Congress who
believed that religious exemptions were sometimes appropriate might
nevertheless expect state control to be sufficient protection. This would be a
reasonable expectation in light of the limited regulatory powers of the federal
government and the long-standing tradition of exemptions in the states.160
As far as proponents of the Constitution were concerned, separationists like
Jefferson and Madison seem unlikely advocates of discretionary religious
exemptions. Both men were highly suspicious of any government control over
the subject of religion. Jefferson, for example, believed there was "no natural
right in opposition to his social duty."'161 Madison, who otherwise seemed more
years (except as herein excepted)
Section 2 ... and all persons who now are or may hereafter be exempted by the laws of
the respective states, shall be, and are hereby exempted from militia duty."
Id.
157 See CHAMBERS, supra note 155, at 288.
158 Note that Representative Benson opposed the amendment in part because it would
allow the judiciary to interfere with "the organization of the militia." See I ANNALS OF CONG.
796 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Rep. Benson).
159 It also makes sense that this changed in 1863-the midst of an upheaval that would
result in a transformation of the original Federalist basis for the First Amendment. See
generally Lash, supra note 3.
16 0 See McConnell, supra note 3. A shift in this view would require shifting one's views
from "states autonomy as guarantor of individual liberty" to "state autonomy as threat to
individual liberty." I believe such a shift had occurred by 1868. See infra Part V.
161 See Jefferson/Danbury Baptist Letter, supra note 101, at 96.
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sympathetic toward religion, 162 nevertheless appears to have been more devoted
to the principle of "no federal power" than to the principle of religious
accommodation. 163 His proposed militia exemption amendment would have
removed the issue from the discretionary control of the legislature. 164 When
Madison spoke of the "immunity of Religion from civil jurisdiction,"'1 65 that
"immunity" seemed to exclude the possibility of legislative accommodations.
For example, Madison was against the practice of employing military chaplains
for navy crews at sea, despite the obvious impact on the sailors' ability to freely
exercise their religion. 166 Conceding the difficulty of the issue, Madison wrote
that it was "safer to trust the consequences of a right principle, than reasonings in
support of a bad one." 167 In other words, better to abridge free exercise than give
the legislature an excuse to regulate religious exercise. In sum, even if Madison
was willing to constitutionalize scrupulous objection to war, he likely would not
have embraced the idea of discretionary accommodation of religion.
Finally, if the separationists had little reason to embrace discretionary
accommodation of religion, the Antifederalists had even less reason to do so.
This would open the door to federal power over the subject of religion-
something Antifederalists were loath to concede. Thus, it is hard to locate a
constituency in Congress who would have been in favor of discretionary
religious accommodations. 168 In fact, as the next section will show, in the early
decades of the Constitution, Congress declined a number of opportunities to pass
legislation accommodating religious exercise.
G. Summary
Although the words of the First Amendment are ambiguous, much of the
commentary by the Founders is not. Rather than focusing on the specific words
162 See McConnell, supra note 3, at 1452.
163 Michael McConnell has argued that Madison may have been open to exemptions in
order to further the goals of religious pluralism. See id. at 1454-55. McConnell, however, does
not address Madison's more separationist arguments in his Detached Memoranda. See
Madison, Detached Memoranda, supra note 101, at 103-05.
164 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
165 James Madison, Letter to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822) [hereinafter
Madison/Livingston Letter], reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONsTITUTION, supra note 46, at
105.
166 Madison, Detached Memoranda, supra note 101, at 104.
167Id.
168 Theoretically, there may have been "Antifederalist accommodationists" who were in
favor of such exemptions. If such an animal existed, it was not in numbers sufficient to leave
an historical record.
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of the religion clauses, time and again the Founders linked the First Amendment
to the Tenth and read these words to express the general principle that Congress
had no power whatsoever over the subject of religion (establishments or free
exercise), power over the same being reserved to the states. Not only does this
approach explain the unique language of the First Amendment in comparison
with the rest of the Bill of Rights, it also tracks the text of the Tenth Amendment
and the concerns of those who adopted the amendment in the hope that it would
protect the states from federal interference with religion. The most likely
interpretation, in light of the text and Founding commentary, is that the religion
clauses were meant to remove--or prevent-the possibility that Congress might
use religion as a means to advance enumerated ends.
It is possible that the First Amendment leaves room for religious exemptions
from generally applicable federal laws. However, such a reading is reconcilable
with the express statements of the Founders only if such exemptions were
understood as not constituting an exercise of power over the subject of religion.
And the option existed only where federal law itself threatened to abridge
religious exercise. The evidence in support of this view, however, is rather weak:
there is little, if any, evidence that the Founders anticipated the need for religious
exemptions from federal law, and the context in which the First Amendment was
enacted cuts against a reading of the First Amendment that would require such
exemptions.
IV. HISTORICAL PRACTICE IN THE POST-ADOPTION PERIOD
In the period between the Founding and Reconstruction, the federal
government involved itself with religion and religious exercise in a variety of
ways. Weighing the relevance of postenactment activities to the original
consensus behind the religion clauses is fraught with difficulty. Nevertheless, if
the post-enactment activities of Congress are consistently and unambiguously at
odds with the "no federal power" explanation, at the very least this raises the
possibility that we have incorrectly understood either the text or what the
Founders meant when they said that Congress had "no power" over the subject
of religion.
Nevertheless, such circumstantial evidence should be viewed in light of what
we have established in the previous section. No Founder at any time expressed
the view that any part of the Constitution legitimately granted Congress power-
direct or indirect-over the subject of religion. To the contrary, what evidence
we have shows remarkable consistency regarding the opposite: the federal
government had no such power. This, at the very least, raises a presumption in
favor of the no federal power theory. Thus, if the historical record presents us
with an ambiguous congressional practice that could be interpreted either as
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consistent with, or inconsistent with, the no power theory, the presumption
dictates that the practice be interpreted in manner consistent with the most
plausible understanding of the text and the Founders' express statements.
Similarly, when confronted with unambiguous congressional practice-acts
that cannot plausibly be interpreted as consistent with the no power theory-
these acts will be presumed to be inconsistent with the most plausible
understanding of the Founders express statements, unless such unambiguous
activity is so pervasive and consistent that it overcomes the most plausible
understanding of those statements. In other words, sporadic unambiguous action
inconsistent with the no power theory will be presumed to be in violation of the
most plausible interpretation of the Constitution. Congress, after all, sometimes
breaches the limits of the Constitution.169 The altemative-allowing post-
enactment practices to presumptively control the meaning of the Constitution-
seems unacceptablypost hoc.
Finally, in considering specific practices, we also should keep in mind what
was not established in the prior section. Even if there were general consensus
regarding the existence of congressional power over the subject of religion, there
may have been little if any consensus regarding why such a restriction was a
good idea. Separationists like Madison and Jefferson applauded the denial of
power as a first step in the direction of complete religious liberty.170 To a
separationist, all religious establishments (both state and federal) are bad.
Defenders of states' rights, on the other hand, might have viewed the religion
clauses as necessary to guaranty state autonomy to regulate religion as the
individual states saw fit. Under this view, religious establishments are neither
good nor bad; they simply are a matter for each state to decide for itself. Finally,
some Founders may have questioned the Constitution's failure to acknowledge
God and continued to believe that civil government had an important role in the
promotion of religion, but nevertheless agreed that local governments were in the
best position to promote the religious beliefs of the community. Under this view,
religious establishments are good, but should be administered at the local level.
All three of these approaches are consistent with the strict "no federal
power" theory of the religion clauses. However, because they are based on
different views regarding the ultimate goal of the federal restriction, each
169 One could, I presume, reverse the presumptions: post-adoption conduct could be
explored first, interpretive theories derived from such conduct, and only then trm to the text
and actual statements made by the Founders regarding the meaning of the Constitution. This
approach, however, would make congressional practice the measure of the meaning of the
Constitution.
170 See, for example, Madison's failed attempt to add an amendment to the Constitution
that would have protected the equal rights of conscience in the states. See supra notes 150-51
and accompanying text.
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approach might lead to different conclusions regarding the scope of the
restriction. For example, if you voted in favor of the religion clauses because you
believed that any government exercise of power over religion is inherently unjust
(or unchristian, as the case may be), then you would probably consider any
government entanglement with religion-say, presidential proclamations calling
for a national day of prayer-to be in violation of the "spirit," if not the letter, of
the Constitution. On the other hand, if you believed that government promotion
of religion was a good thing, but voted for the religion clauses in order to protect
the autonomy of the states, then you might be open to some degree of federal
promotion of religion as long as the federal activity did not imply that the federal
government had power to interfere with state regulation of religion. In sum, even
if there was consensus regarding the core meaning of the religion clauses, one's
view of how far that "core" extended might depend on one's reasons for voting
for the restriction in the first place.
A. Acts Regarding the Territories and Native Americans
Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be
encouraged. 17 1
One of the initial acts of the First Congress was to make provisions for
churches and missionaries in the territories. 172 This took the form both of money
and land grants, and it continued throughout much of the nineteenth century.173
Territorial regulations included coerced observance of the Sabbath and
prohibitions against (Christian) blasphemy.174 Presuming that Congress believed
its actions were justified under a plausible reading of the First Amendment, these
actions are inconsistent with the idea that Congress had no power over the
subject of religion.
For this reason, congressional promotion of religion in the territories is
sometimes cited as evidence that, whatever else might be forbidden by the
Establishment Clause, that clause was not understood as a barrier against laws
which generally promote religious exercise.175 Of course, we could go much
further than this: such regulation appears to indicate that Congress believed it had
power to coercively establish religion in the territories and restrict its free
exercise-or, at the least, Congress believed it had the authority to delegate the
171 The Northwest Ordinance, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1787) (quoting art. III).
172 See Bradley, supra note 47.
17 3 See generally ROBERT CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 57 (1982).
174 See BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 102.
175 See id.
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same power to territorial governments. How do we reconcile the presumptive no
power theory of the First Amendment with what we know about contemporary
regulation of religion in the territories?
To begin with, congressional power in the territories is plenary. 176 In this
176 See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1, 42 (1890). Justice Bradley noted:
The power of Congress over the Territories of the United States is general and plenary,
arising from and incidental to the right to acquire the Territory itself, and from the power
given by the Constitution to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
Territory or other property belonging to the United States.
Id. at 42. See National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1879). Chief Justice
Waite reasoned:
In the organic act of Dakota there was not an express reservation of power in Congress to
amend the acts of the territorial legislature, nor was it necessary. Such a power is an
incident of sovereignty, and continues until granted away. Congress may not only
abrogate laws of the territorial legislatures, but it may itself legislate directly for the local
government It may make a void act of the territorial legislature valid, and a valid act void.
In other words, it has full and complete legislative authority over the people of the
Territories and all the departments of the territorial governments. It may do for the
Territories what the people, under the Constitution of the United States, may do for the
States.
Id. at 133; see also Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 242 (1850) (explaining that
territorial governments established by Congress "are legislative governments, and their courts
legislative courts, Congress, in the exercise of its powers in the organization and government of
the Territories, combining the powers of both the Federal and State authorities").
In Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 435 (1856), Chief Justice Taney noted
in dicta that the Bill of Rights applied with equal force in the territories. If so, then presumably
any exercise of power over religion in the territories could be exercised with equal vigour
outside the territories. Even if principles of federalism stood as a barrier to similar action
outside the territories-prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, if Congress believed the Bill of
Rights applied in the territories, then any action involving religion in the territories would stand
as evidence that Congress interpreted the First Amendment to allow Congress some power to
regulate religion. In fact, the Court has never held that the Bill of Rights, much less the religion
clauses themselves, applied directly to their actions in the territories. See Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244, 257 (1901). Congress during this period also apparently did not think that the
religion clauses applied directly to the territories. For example, in 1860, Justin Morrill
introduced a proviso to a bill that would criminalize polygamy in the territories: "Provided, that
this act shall be so limited and construed as not to affect or interfere with ... the right 'to
worship God according to the dictates of conscience."' CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess.
1410 (1860). This phrasing is far closer to the wording in state constitutions than the wording
of the federal religion clauses. The debates over the anti-polygamy bill show a concern for "the
rights of conscience," but the only direct reference to the religion clauses binding congressional
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regard, congressional power is analogous to the powers of state governments. 177
Secondly, the "no federal power" theory was not necessarily based on the
principle that laws respecting religious establishments were inherently bad. The
principle merely removed the issue from the hands of the federal government
and left it to the states. Notwithstanding the separationist views of men like
Madison and Jefferson, many people throughout this period continued to believe
that government regulation of religion in the states was an indispensable aspect
of responsible government. 178 Pro (state) establishment members of Congress
believed it was their duty to promote religion in the territories, just as it was their
duty to do so in the states.179 Thus, when Congress authorized territorial laws
prohibiting blasphemy and mandating observance of the Sabbath,1 80 it acted as a
proto-state government, presumably preparing the territory-and the population
therein-for admission to the Union, at which time such laws would continue to
be enforced.181 In other words, in enacting these laws, a majority in Congress
action in the territories came from Representative Nelson who suggested that the Mormons had
set up a theocracy under congressional authority-in violation of the Establishment Clause. See
id. at 190 app. (remarks of Mr. Nelson). Similarly, the religious freedom clause of the
Northwest Ordinance provides that "no person... shall ever be molested on account of his
mode of worship ... in the said territory." ch. 8, 1 Stat. 52 (1789) (quoting art. I1). This comes
nowhere near the absolute restriction of the federal First Amendment and seems far closer to
the "toleration" clauses of contemporary state constitutions.
177 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States."). Article I, § 8, Clause 17 gives Congress power "[t]o exercise exclusive
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District... as may, by Cession of particular
States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United
States." Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. By giving Congress "exclusive" legislative power, this implies
general police power to govern the territory. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 28; see also supra
cases cited in note 176.
178 See, e.g., STORY, supra note 102, at § 986 (discussing the interest of a state in
protecting and promoting religious exercise). See generally Lash, supra note 3, at 1118.
179 See, e.g., STORY, supra note 102, at § 986.
180 See BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 97-104; Lash, supra note 79, at 1096.
181 See, for example, the debates on the Anti-Polygamy Act, which banned polygamy in
the territories. Representative Gooch commented:
I consider that this Government stands in the relation of parent to all these territories; that
it is the duty of the General Government to provide a government for these territories; to
enact laws for them; and, when they have reached a stage of maturity in which they are
capable of instituting certain acts of legislation for themselves, it is good policy-and
experience has taught us so-to authorize them to act for themselves. When they fail to
govern themselves as they should, I believe we should adopt the same policy that a
judicious parent pursues with reference to his child.
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may have applied a "pro-state establishment" construction of the no power
principle. If so, this would not undermine the broader principle that Congress-
as Congress-had no power over the subject of religion.182
Finally, the number of congressional acts that actually regulated religion as
religion in the territories was quite small. Most of the federal government's
involvement with religion came in the form of educational aid to religious
organizations serving Native Americans. 183 Although there was a religious
component to this education, this by itself is not enough to make such aid an
exercise of power over the subject of religion. Pursuing a policy of education in
the territories required the assistance of private institutions, and the only
institutions providing such a service at this time were religious organizations. 184
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1542 (remarks of Rep. Gooch).
During the debates over what to do about the Mormon practice of polygamy in Utah
territory, there was very little discussion of the First Amendment. One member argued that the
Mormons had set up a theological state in violation of the Establishment Clause. See id. at app.
190 (remarks of Rep. Nelson) (arguing that the Church's corporate charter, if "liberally
interpreted" would give the Church the power to make laws for the territory). Nelson also cites
Dred Scott and was therefore aware of Taney's dicta that the religion clauses applied in the
territories. See id. at 192. If so, to the extent that these members voted to regulate polygamy
because it violated Christian religious doctrine, this would be inconsistent with the "no power"
principle of the religion clauses. However, there were secular reasons to vote against
polygamy, and it was on these secular grounds that the law ultimately was upheld. See
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878).
182 In fact, during the first decades, Congress seemed to go out of its way to avoid the
charge that it was legislating on the subject of religion even in areas under its plenary control.
For example, in 1811, Congress enacted a law that incorporated the Episcopal Church in what
was then the District of Columbia. See 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 983-85, 995-98 (1811). This, in
itself, was not a law regulating religion-Congress had simply granted the Episcopal Church
the same opportunity it offered other groups to take advantage of the corporate form. President
Madison, however, vetoed the bill on the grounds that enforcing the articles of incorporation in
this case would place the government in the position of enforcing the tenets of a particular
religion. See id. at 983-84. Upon return of the bill with Madison's objections, the House
declined to reconsider the bill on a vote of 74 to 29. See id. at 997-98. Given the importance of
the corporate form to religious societies, good faith compliance with the Free Exercise Clause
might have justified the act of incorporation-indeed, this may have been why Congress acted
in the first place. However, even if this was the opinion of some members, that opinion was not
so widely, or so confidently, shared by other members to gamer enough votes to reconsider the
matter.
183 See generally ANTIEAU, supra note 25, at 167; CORD, supra note 173, at 57.
184 See, for example, congressional act ceding land in the territory of Ohio to the United
Brethren "for propagating the gospel among the heathen." CORD, supra note 173, at 43; see
also id. at 38 (noting an 1803 treaty with Kaskasia Indians that provided "federal money to
support a Catholic priest in his priestly duties, and further to provide money to build a
church"). In regard to the latter, the grant was in exchange for land. Obviously, it cannot be
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No doubt, the policy was popular because it sought to both "civilize" and
"Christianize" the Native Americans 1 85 However, the mere fact that a policy
coincided with religious purposes does not by itself transform the act into a
regulation of religion as religion.' 86 In fact, Congress did not regulate or require
religious instruction and often conditioned funding on the continued
advancement of secular educational goals.' 87 Indeed, it would have required
introducing a religious classification into laws had Congress wished to support
Native American education but exclude religious institutions from participating
in the federal program.1 88 Thus, subsidizing religious education of the Indians
neither implicates congressional power outside the territories nor does it stand as
taken as evidence that Jefferson believed he had power to tax for the provision of priests and
the building of churches. This is just another example of plenary federal power to deal with the
territories and acquisition of land. Jefferson's actions do, however, raise some interesting
questions regarding the executive's power to use religion as a tool of foreign policy. See infra
Part IV.C.4.
185 See John Quincy Adams, Message of the President, 5 Cong. Deb. app. 2, 5 (1828)
("[A]s brethren of the human race.... we endeavored to bring [Indian tribes] to the knowledge
of religion and letters.").
186 For the first 150 years of the Constitution, federal support of religious institutions
providing secular services was not considered acting intentionally to support religion. Compare
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 299-300 (1899) (holding that there was no constitutional
barrier to congressional appropriation of funds for maintenance of a District of Columbia
hospital run by Roman Catholic nuns) and Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 82 (1908)
(rejecting the argument that the Constitution forbids payment of government held monies for
support of religious schools on Indian reservation) with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
625 (1971) (requiring the exclusion of parochial schools from state educational assistance).
This is not to say such aid was uncontroversial. The possibility that religiously neutral aid
might indirectly fund Roman Catholic educational efforts was deeply controversial. For this
reason, a number of states amended their constitutions to expressly forbid such aid. See Lash,
supra note 79, at 1125. The so-called Blaine Amendment, for example, was an effort to amend
the federal Constitution to forbid educational aid going to "sectarian institutions." Id. at 1146.
187 See Treaty With the Osages, Dec. 30, 1825, U.S.-Osage Tribe, 7 Stat. 240. Article 10
of the treaty states:
It is further agreed... that there shall be reserved two sections of land ... to include the
Missionary establishment... for the benefit of said Missions, and to establish them at the
principal villages of the Great and Little Osage Nations, within the limits of the country
reserved to them by this Treaty, and to be kept up at said villages, so long as said Missions
shall be usefully employed in teaching, civilizing, and improving, the said Indians.
Id. at 242-43; see also H.R. REP. No. 31-171, at 4 (1850) ("[I]t has been ascertained that no
such office [of Indian Station Chaplains] exists at such stations, and that when clergymen are
employed at such points it is as teachers of schools only.").
188 It also would have required a federal bureaucracy not then-or now-in existence.
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an unambiguous example of power over the subject of religion-even as an
aspect of territorial prerogative.189
In summary, then, to the extent that congressional acts in the territories were
exercises of power over the subject of religion, territorial powers are
distinguishable from the generally enumerated-and limited-powers of
Congress.190 Moreover, most of the actions involving religion in the territories
are ambiguous in regard to their use of religion either as a means or an end. In
the end, Congress's actions in the territories do not clearly contradict the
conclusions in the previous section that Congress had neither express power over
religion, nor the option of using religion as a means to advancing an enumerated
end.
B. Symbolic Acts
Ceremonial use of religious rhetoric and symbols have pervaded the actions
of the federal government from its inception to the present. Washington himself
initiated the tradition of concluding the Presidential Oath of Office with "So help
me God." 191 The Supreme Court's tradition of opening its sessions with "God
save the United States and this Honorable Court" apparently dates from the
Court's first session in 1790.192 With the exception of Thomas Jefferson and
189 In his book, Separation of Church and State, Robert Cord compiles the documents
relating to the campaign to Christianize and "civilize" the Indians through the support of
Christian missionaries. See CORD, supra note 173, at 62-73. No doubt, the documents are
evidence of a dual-intent policy; those engaged in the project saw the missionary project as
preparing the Indian for admission into "society." The fact that these efforts coincided with
religious goals, however, does not make them examples of government regulation of religion
as religion. Put another way, because the actions could plausibly be justified on secular
grounds and because no one claimed to be regulating religion, there is nothing in these actions
necessarily inconsistent with the proposition that the Constitution contained no power to
regulate religion.
190 Similar in this regard are congressional requirements that territories seeking admission
as states draft a constitution that includes religious liberty provisions. See, e.g., Act of Feb 20,
1811, ch. 21, 2 Stat. 641-43 (1811). Any such requirements became null once the territory
became a state. See Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 588, 610 (1845).
191 See Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS 1 (1967).
192 The first Supreme Court crier-one Richard Wenman-was appointed at the second
meeting of the Supreme Court in 1790. See Appendix: Centennial Celebration of the
Organization of the Federal Judiciary, 134 U.S. 711, 712 (1890). Presumably, he adopted the
practice of "God save the United States and this Honorable Court" from the states-who in
tum had adapted the English Crier's declaration "God save the Queen." See Letter from Lord
Chancellor's Office, House of Lords, Jan. 8, 1962 (copy on file with author) (describing the
English Practice). Today, the crier is an employee of the Marshal's office, and not an official of
the court. The office of Marshal of the Court itself was not created until 1867. Prior to that
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Andrew Jackson, Thanksgiving proclamations-once again, initiated by
Washington193-were promulgated by every President between 1789 and the
Civil War.194 Beginning with the Continental Congress, continuing through the
First Congress, and down to this day, Congress has consistently opened its
sessions in prayer.195
Although these symbolic links between church and state have been criticized
from the beginning, 196 the voices of objection have always been a minority.
Even those opposed to symbolic governmental acknowledgment of God
generally conceded that such practices were permissible, if not wise. For
example, Madison, whose scrupulousness in these matters went so deep as to
lead him to veto a bill incorporating the Episcopal Church in the District of
Columbia,197 himself issued Thanksgiving proclamations, though later in private
writings he regretted doing so. 198 To Madison, it was not the proclamation itself,
but rather its form that triggered his greatest concern. In a letter to Edward
Livingston, Madison objected to proclamations that used "the language of
injunction."199 Such proclamations "have lost sight of the equality of all
religious sects in the eve of the Constitution." 200 Madison then distinguished his
own proclamations as non-sectarian symbolic gestures:
Whilst I was honored with the Executive Trust I found it necessary on more than
one occasion to follow the example of predecessors. But I was always careful to
make the Proclamations absolutely indiscriminate, and merely recommendatory;
time, the U.S. Marshals for the District of Columbia served as informal Marshal of the
Supreme Court. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 761
(2d ed. 1979).
193 See I STOKES, supra note 130, at 481-92. The official practice of "fast day"
proclamations actually began with the Continental Congress. See id. at 451.
194 See 3 STOKES, supra note 130, at 180-87.
195 For a thorough discussion of the historical practice of congressional prayers, see the
Supreme Court's opinion in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
196 In the First Congress, New Jersey Representative Elias Boudinot introduced a bill
recommending "a day of public thanksgiving and prayer." I ANNALS OF CONG. 949 (Joseph
Gales ed., 1789) (motion of Rep. Boudinot). Representative Thomas Tucker of South Carolina
objected on the grounds that "it is a religious matter, and as such, is proscribed to us. If a day of
thanksgiving must take place, let it be done by the authority of the several States." Id. at 950.
The resolution was approved, but there is no indication whether the majority voted in favor of
the recommendation because they believed Congress did have power over the subject of
religion, or because they believed a proclamation was not truly an exercise ofpower. See id.
197 See 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 982-83 (1811) (message from President Madison).
198 See Madison, Detached Memoranda, supra note 101, at 105.
199 Madison/Livingston Letter, supra note 165, at 105.
200 Id.
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or rather mere designations of a day, on which all who thought proper might
unite in consecrating it to religious purposes, according to their own faith and
forms. In this sense, I presume you reserve to the Govt. a right to appoint
particular days for religious worship throughout the State, without any penal
sanction enforcing the worship.2 01
Madison thus distinguished between presidential recommendations for a day of
prayer and proclamations enjoining the Country to pray.202  True,
recommendations were also problematic to Madison, but not because they were
themselves an exercise of power. Instead, the problem was that "[a]ltho'
recommendations only, they imply a religious agency, making no part of the trust
delegated to political rulers. ' 203 The mere fact that government was associating
itself with religious trappings was enough to make Madison uncomfortable, but
he distinguished such violations of the "spirit" from clear violations of the
"letter." Similarly, Madison criticized the practice of appointing congressional
chaplains-not because of the symbolism, but because they were paid for out of
the public treasury-to which the people are coerced to contribute.204 His
solution was not the abolishment of the office of chaplain, but funding the office
out of the pockets of the Congressmen themselves.205
Some separationists, of course, took a stricter view. Thomas Jefferson, for
example, believed that presidential proclamations were in fact coercive,
whatever their form. Indeed, he believed they had the effect of law, and for this
201 Id. In his Proclamation of November 16, 1814, Madison wrote:
The tvo Houses of the National Legislature having by a joint resolution expressed
their desire that in the present time of public calamity and war a day may be
recommended to be observed by the people of the United States as a day of public
humiliation and fasting and of prayer to Almighty God for the safety and welfare of these
States, His blessing on their arms, and a speedy restoration of peace, I have deemed it
proper by this proclamation to recommend that Thursday, the 12th of January next, be set
apart as a day on which all may have an opportunity of voluntarily offering at the same
time in their respective religious assemblies their humble adoration to the Great Sovereign
of the Universe, of confessing their sins and transgressions, and of strengthening their
vows of repentance and amendment.
James Madison, Proclamation (Nov. 16, 1814), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CoNsTIrrrIoN,
supra note 46, at 102.
202 Cf. Richardson v. Goddard, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 28, 43-45 (1859) (holding that "fast
days" recommended by the governor are mere recommendations and do not excuse a purchaser
from accepting responsibility for goods delivered on a fast day).
203 Madison, Detached Memoranda, supra note 101, at 105 (emphasis added).
204 See id. at 104; infra Part IV.C.3 (discussing federal chaplains).
205 See Madison, Detached Memoranda, supra note 101, at 104.
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reason he refused to follow the "example of his predecessors. 120 6 Jefferson's
view, however, was the minority. 20 7 Or, put another way, he put a "Jeffersonian
spin" on the no federal power principle. To Jefferson, any government
involvement with religion was impermissible-particularly, but not exclusively,
involvement by the federal government.208
In general, the Founders' position on the federal government's use of
religious symbols seems to depend on their position on the more general issue of
the proper relationship between church and government-federal or state. There
being no consensus on that issue in the early decades of the Constitution, each
administration followed its own policy. According to Jefferson:
206 Thomas Jefferson in a letter to Samuel Miller wrote:
But it is only proposed that I should recommend, not prescribe a day of fasting & prayer.
That is, that I should indirectly assume to the U. S. an authority over religious exercises
which the Constitution has directly precluded them from. It must be meant too that this
recommendation is to carry some authority, and to be sanctioned by some penalty on
those who disregard it not indeed of fine and imprisonment, but of some degree of
proscription perhaps in public opinion. And does the change in the nature of the penalty
make the recommendation the less a law of conduct for those to whom it is directed? I do
not believe it is for the interest of religion to invite the civil magistrate to direct it's
exercises, it's discipline, or it's doctrines; nor of the religious societies that the general
government should be invested with the power of effecting any uniformity of time or
matter among them.
Jefferson/Miller Letter, supra note 95, at 98-99.
207 Andrew Jackson, who also declined to issue religious proclamations while in office,
appears to have shared Jefferson's concerns regarding the implications of Proclamations. See
Letter from Andrew Jackson to the Synod of the Reformed Church (June 12, 1832), reprinted
in 4 CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON 447 (John Spencer Bassett ed., 1929). Jackson
wrote:
I am constrained to decline the appointment of any period or mode as proper for the
public manifestation of this reliance [on the efficacy of prayer]. I could not do otherwise
without transcending those limits which are prescribed by the Constitution for the
President and without feeling that I might in some degree disturb the security which
religion now enjoys in this country in its complete separation from the political concerns
of the General Govemment.
Id.; see also Daniel J. Dreisbach, "Sowing Useful Truths and Principles": The Danbury
Baptists, Thomas Jefferson, and the "Wall of Separation," 39 J. OF CHURCH & STATE 455,478
n.58 (1997).
208 Jefferson did issue proclamations when he was governor of Virginia. Although
Jefferson may have been more willing to acquiesce when acting as a state-as opposed to a
federal-official, no where in his writings does he indicate any agreement with those who
argued that the states had any legitimate power over religion.
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I am aware that the practice of my predecessors may be quoted... Be this
as it may, every one must act according to the dictates of his own reason, &
mine tells me that civil power alone have been given to the President of the US.
and no authority to direct the religious exercises of his constituents. 20 9
Although one might agree with Jefferson that even symbolic religious acts by the
federal government violate the concept of no federal power, there is no indication
that this opinion was widely shared in 1791--or in the following decades.2 10
C. Law
There are at least two clear classes of federal action involving religion in this
period that occurred outside the territories and that had more than merely
symbolic effect: the use of religious exemptions from otherwise generally
applicable laws and the provision of chaplains at public expense for Congress
and the Armed Forces.
1. Exemptions
a. Tax and Import Exemptions
Religious-based tax exemptions 211 became part of federal law almost by
default. At the time of the Founding, most, if not all, states exempted church
property from the state's real estate tax.212 When the federal government moved
to the District of Columbia, Congress enacted a law which adopted the tax
policies already in place under Virginia law, including exemptions for churches
209 Jefferson/Miller Letter, supra note 95, at 99.
2 10 Jefferson himself seems to accept the distinction between symbolic and coercive
government activity when he distinguishes between direct and indirect use of governmental
authority. See supra note 206.
211 One could argue that religious exemptions are not exercises of power on the subject of
religion, but are instead efforts by the government to not influence the exercise of religion. See
Laycock, supra note 17, at 313 ("Most exemptions do very little to draw adherents to a faith.
But criminal liability or loss of government benefits is a powerful incentive to abandon a faith.
Exemptions-treating religion differently-are generally more neutral because they generally
minimize government influence on religion."). From another point of view, of course, religious
exemptions from generally applicable laws constitute special treatment. See City of Boeme v.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring). The issues addressed in this
section is whether (1) the exemptions were necessarily religious in nature, and (2) whether
those enacting the exemptions viewed them as laws on the subject of religion.
2 12 For a general discussion of the historical practice of religious-based tax exemptions in.
the states, see the Supreme Court's opinion in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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within the District.213 Tax laws in the District, of course, are analogous to
congressional action in the territories-Congress was acting in the capacity of a
state legislature.
In the same period, Congress refunded import duties on religious articles on
a case-by-case basis as recommended by the House Committee on Ways and
Means. Whether these exemptions count as an exercise of power over religion
depends upon how you characterize them.2 14 To the extent that these exemptions
were provided to church groups because of their role in advancing the cause of
religion, this would be a case of exemption power exercised on behalf of
religion 215 On the other hand, to the extent that religious organizations receive
exemptions simply because they are charitable organizations, these exemptions
would not be understood as an exercise of power over religion as such.
Congress itself analogized these exemptions to those provided for other non-
profit charitable activities. For example, in 1826, the House Committee of Ways
and Means recommended an exemption from import duties for certain church
vestments, furniture, and paintings. According to the Committee Report:
[Tihe articles referred to by the memorialist not having been purchased, or
imported by him with a view to any commercial profits, and not being articles of
consumption except as connected with the service of the Church over which he
presides, it is but reasonable to exempt them from the payment of duties.216
In 1842, Mr. J.R. Ingersoll of the House Committee of Ways and Means
recommended remission of duties paid on certain church bells imported from
2 13 See id. at 677.
214 For example, compare J.P. THOMPSON, CHUCRH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
119 (1873) ("In many states, houses of religious worship are exempted from taxation for the
support of the civil govemment, upon the ground that religion, as a conservator of public
morals, assists in preserving the peace and order of society") with COOLEY, supra note 102, at
471 (Regarding state executive proclamations, government chaplaincies, and tax exemptions).
Cooley noted:
This public recognition of religious worship, however, is not based entirely, perhaps even
mainly, upon a sense of what is due to the Supreme Being himself, as the author of all
good and of all law; but the same reasons of state policy which induce the government to
aid institutions of charity and seminaries of instruction, will incline it also to foster
religious worship and religious institutions, as conservators of the public morals, and
valuable, if not indispensable assistants to the preservation of the public order.
Id.
215 Today, under the holding of Walz, tax exemptions are justifiable attempts to avoid
.church-state entanglement which would occur should the taxes go unpaid. See 397 U.S. at 674.
2 16 H.R REP. No. 19-206 (1826).
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England:
They were imported... for what may be properly regarded public benefit and
use. The general conmnunity which has received them has the advantage of
them. They are not only designed to summon religious assemblies to places of
worship, but are adapted to the celebration of great national events, and to
animate the hearts of freemen on occasions connected with the honor and glory
of their country.217
Congress included these exemptions with those given to other secular non-profit
activities. Again, if churches were understood as one of many charitable
organizations, then excluding religious property from an otherwise available
exemption would itself require an exercise of regulatory power along religious
lines.218
b. Military Exemptions
The issue of exempting religious objectors from state militia service was
first discussed-and rejected-during the debates on what would become the
Second Amendment.219 As discussed in the previous section, Madison's
proposal ultimately failed. 220 Seventy years later, however, the 38th Congress
believed that it had power to protect "the rights of conscience" and acted upon it.
During the Civil War, an amendment to the Conscription Act provided an
exemption from the draft for the religiously scrupulous.221 The exemption was
passed after a number of impassioned speeches regarding the rights of
conscience. 222 Thus, by the time of the Civil War, a majority of Congress
apparently believed that it had power to enact religious classifications in order to
217 H.R REP. No. 27-19 (1842). Ingersoll goes on to cite as "precedents," the duties
remitted on a statue of General Washington. See id. at 2.
218 The idea being that regulation of one class of similarly situated groups tends to
channel activity towards or away from the "exempted" group. See generally Michael W.
McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1989) (proposing "an economic definition of neutrality" to determine when
govemment action impinges impermissibly on religious choice).
219 Madison proposed appending the following to what would become the Second
Amendment: "no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render
military service in person." See I ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). The Select
Committee modified this to "no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear
arms." Id. at 778.
220 See supra Part II.F.
221 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 204 (1864).
222 See id. See generally Lash, supra note 3, at 1144-45.
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protect the religious scruples of a conscientious objector.
The significance of this exemption depends on a number of factors. First, as
discussed in the last section, providing an exemption may not have been
understood to constitute an exercise of power as such. The granting of
exemptions, then, does not necessarily imply that Congress believed it had the
general power to act on behalf of religious freedom. On the other hand, it is
possible-if not necessary-to view this exemption as evidence that Congress
believed it had some degree of responsibility to act affirmatively on behalf of
religious exercise.223 However, the fact that the exemption was enacted over
seventy years after the adoption of the First Amendment makes it rather weak
evidence of the original understanding of congressional power.224
c. Summary ofExemptions
Federal exemptions respecting religion in the period between 1789 and 1868
are few and far between, and most are ambiguous regarding their status as
exemptions for religion as religion. The only unambiguous example of a
religious-based exemption-the Civil War military exemption-was passed just
prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, too many years after the
Founding to reflect original intent.225 Taken together, these exemptions do not
call into question the presumption, arrived at in the previous section, that the
original understanding of congressional power did not include any discretionary
power over the subject of religion.
2. The Sunday Mail Controversy
In the early nineteenth century, there was considerable public pressure to
stop federal delivery of the mail on Sunday-the "Sabbath" to many Christian
denominations. 226 Delivery of the mail, it was argued, not only profaned the
Sabbath, it also prevented postal employees from "enjoy[ing] the same
opportunities of attending to moral and religious instruction or intellectual
223 I have argued as much. See Lash, supra note 3.
224 This exemption may, however, signal Congress' intentions regarding the Fourteenth
Amendment. See infra Part V; see also Lash, supra note 3.
225 Here too there is ambiguity because the exemption might reflect an exercise of
discretion (not compelled by the First Amendment, but good policy nonetheless) or it might
reflect congressional compliance with the mandates of the First Amendment (necessary to
avoid passing a law abridging the free exercise of religion-the rights of conscience). I believe
the latter fueled the adoption of the militia exemption. See id.
226 See generally 2 STOKES, supra note 130, at 12.
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improvement on that day which is enjoyed by the rest of their fellow citizens. '227
In other words, Sunday mail delivery arguably raised "free exercise"
concerns.228 Congress, however, refused to stop Sunday mail delivery on
account of the religious nature of the objections. The matter having been referred
to the Committee of the Senate on the Post Office and Post Roads, Senator and
future Vice-President Richard M. Johnson issued a report asserting that Congress
had no power to resolve what was, essentially, a religious controversy.
According to Johnson:
Should Congress, in their legislative capacity, adopt the sentiment it would
establish the principle that the Legislature is a proper tribunal to determine what
are the laws of God. ... [T]he constitution has wisely withheld from our
government the power of defining the divine law.... It is the settled conviction
of the committee that the only method [of] avoiding [the slippery slope to
religious establishments], with their attendant train of evils, is to adhere strictly
to the spirit of the constitution, which regards the General Government in no
other light than that of a civil institution, wholly destitute of religious authority.
What other nations call religious toleration, we call religious rights. 229
Johnson lost his seat in the Senate that year, but was reelected to the House of
Representatives the next year, 230 where he elaborated on his prior report:
Congress acts under a constitution of delegated and limited powers. The
2 27 William McCreery, Minority Report to the House of Representatives (March 5,
1830), reprinted in 2 STOKES, supra note 130, at 18. The minority report declaimed any
intention of establishing a rule of religious or moral law, but instead argued what would
become the standard justification for Sunday Closing laws: societal health. After rejecting the
argument that the petitioners sought congressional resolution of a religious controversy
between "Jews, Sabbatarians, and other denominations," McCreery claimed that:
The good of society requires the strict observance of one day in seven. Paley, and other
writers on moral philosophy, have shown that the resting of men every seventh day; their
winding up their labors and concerns once in seven days; their abstraction from the affairs
of the world, to improve their minds and converse with their Maker, their orderly
attendance upon the ordinances of public worship and instruction have a direct and
powerful tendency to improve the morals and temporal happiness of mankind.
Id.
228 These concerns were sometimes regarded in the states. See State v. Ambs, 20 Mo.
214,218 (1854) (upholding Sunday closing law in part on free exercise grounds).
229 2 STOKES, supra note 130, at 15-16.
2 30 See id. I am not aware of any connection between Johnson loosing his seat in the
Senate-at that time an appointment made by the state legislature-and his position on Sunday
mail delivery. Note that Johnson was elected to the House of Representatives the next year.
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committee look in vain to that instrument for a delegation of power authorizing
this body to inquire and determine what part of time, or whether any, has been
set apart by the Almighty for religious exercises. On the contrary, among the
few prohibitions which it contains, is one that prohibits a religious test and
another which declares that Congress shall pass no law respecting an
establishing of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.2 31
Johnson's report prevailed 232 and the petitions seeking to stop Sunday mail
delivery were rejected.
Of course, even a Congress open to the idea of promoting the free exercise
of postal workers nevertheless might have turned aside the calls to stop Sunday
mail delivery on the grounds that such an accommodation came too close to a
law respecting an establishment of religion. If so, however, their sensibilities
were far more separationist than our own: there has been no regular Sunday mail
delivery in the United States since early this century.2 33 More likely, a majority
agreed with Johnson's argument that even this modest an accommodation should
be rejected on the grounds that granting it would raise serious issues of
congressional power over the subject of religion.
3. Federal Chaplains
Military chaplains were appointed as early as the Revolutionary War234 and
were made an official part of the American armed forces in 1791.235 Opening
231 2 STOKES, supra note 130, at 17. Notice, once again, the incorrect quoting of religion
clauses.
232 
"Mr. Johnson's celebrated Sunday Mail Report' was cited by Chief Justice Terry of
the California Supreme Court as advocating the principle of "complete separation of church
and state." Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 506 (1858); see also id. at 514-15 (Burnette, J.,
concurring) (noting that legislatures may not force religious act or observance because it "has
no power over such a subject!). Johnson's Report was officially endorsed by the Indiana,
Illinois, and Alabama state legislatures. See 2 STOKES, supra note 130, at 18-19. The General
Assembly of Indiana sent a memorial to Congress endorsing Johnson's Report and declaring
"all legislative interference in matters of religion is contrary to the genius of Christianity; and
that there are no doctrines or observances inculcated by the Christian religion which require the
arm of civil power either to enforce or to sustain them." Id. at 19.
233 See 3 STOKES, supra note 130, at 110. For a general discussion of the history of
congressional chaplains, see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
234 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794.
235See 3 STOKES, supra note 130, at 111. In 1806, Congress passed "An Act for
Establishing Rules and Articles for the government of the Armies of the United States." Ch. 20,
2 Stat. 359 (1806). Under this act, it was "earnestly recommended to all officers and soldiers,
diligently to attend divine service; and all officers who shall behave indecently or irreverently
at any place of divine worship, shall, if commissioned officers, be brought before a general
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legislative sessions in prayer began in the first session of the Continental
Congress in 1774,236 and the office of congressional chaplain was established by
the First Congress in 1789.237 In the beginning, neither military nor
congressional chaplains raised much controversy-indeed, Madison himself was
a member of the committee that instituted the chaplaincy. 238 By the 1830s,
however, federal chaplains received increasing criticism from both Nativists-
who objected to the appointment of Roman Catholics-and strict Separationists
who were waging a successful battle against religious establishments in the
states. In 1833, petitions were sent to Congress objecting to the employment of
chaplains at public expense. According to one "Remonstrance":
The constitution contains a full specification of all the powers that have been
delegated by the people to their political representatives; none but civil powers
are therein or thereby delegated, their representatives, therefore, not being vested
with any ecclesiastical authority, have no right to legislate on religion, nor
officially to do or perform, or direct to be done and performed, any ecclesiastical
act or ceremony.239
The next decade witnessed increasing criticism of the use of federal
chaplains, especially following the appointment of Roman Catholics.240 Prior to
court martial, there to be publicly and severely reprimanded by the president." Id. at 360
(noting further that non-commissioned officers were to be fined). Article Four of that same act
provided that:
Every chaplain, commissioned in the army or armies of the United States, who shall
absent himself from the duties assigned him (excepting in cases of sickness or leaves of
absence) shall, on conviction thereof before a court martial, be fined not exceeding one
month's pay, besides the loss of his pay during his absence; or be discharged, as the court
martial shall judge proper.
Id.
236 See 1 STOKES, supra note 130, at 448.
237 See id. at 456-57. Earlier, in the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin
successfully proposed turning to daily prayer as a means of breaking through an impasse in the
debates. See id at 454.
238 See id. at 456. Though he came to regret it. See Madison, Detached Memoranda,
supra note 101, at 105.
23 9 H.R. Doc. No. 23-9 (1833). In 1848, a similar memorial from the Kehukee Primitive
Baptist Association in North Carolina was sent to Congress, objecting to chaplains in Congress
and the military and to subsidizing religious teachers for the education of Indians on the
grounds that such constituted acts 'respecting the establishment of religion."' See S. MISC.
Doc. No. 30-2 (1848).
240 In 1832, Congress appointed its first non-Protestant chaplain, the Reverend Charles
Constantine Pise. See 3 STOKES, supra note 130, at 129. The appointment was controversial
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the War with Mexico, there were no Catholic chaplains in the army; Catholic
soldiers were expected to attend Protestant services.2 41 In 1846, mainly to allay
concerns by Mexican residents that the invading American Army was on a
mission to destroy the Catholic Church, President Polk directed his Secretary of
War to appoint a number of Catholic priests to accompany the Army into
Mexico.242 Prominent newspapers printed letters objecting to the appointment of
Catholic "spies." The Protestant New York Observer, for example, denounced
the action as "a flagrant outrage upon the constitution."243 In 1848, a Memorial
sent to Congress from the Kehukee Primitive Baptist Association in North
Carolina objected to chaplains in Congress and the military-as well as to the
subsidizing of religious teachers for the education of Indians-on the grounds
that these were acts 'respecting the establishment of religion"' 244 made all the
more dangerous by "the rapid strides of priestcraft now being made in these
United States. '" 245
Congress eventually was forced to respond to the growing controversy. In
the period from 1850 to 1854, Congress issued at least three separate reports on
the constitutional status of government-paid chaplains. Each of these reports,
with one significant exception which is described in detail below, followed the
same general argument. First, the Constitution conferred power on Congress to
appoint officers for both Houses of Congress and for the military. Second, this
appointment power was unrestricted and included power to appoint religious
officers if doing so was deemed "necessary and proper" by Congress and no
express provision in the Constitution forbade such an appointment. Third, the
Establishment Clause was not a prohibition on any and all congressional action
involving religion, but merely prohibited coercive, or sectarian regulation-
neither of which, it was argued, characterized the appointment of chaplains.
Fourth, the practice of employing chaplains had deep historical roots. Finally,
ending the practice would have serious free exercise implications for both
soldiers in the military and the Congressmen themselves.
As the source of power to appoint military chaplains, the reports generally
enough to prompt Pise to give a public speech the next year in which he declared "I
acknowledge no allegiance to the Pope's temporal power." Id. at 130.
241 See 2 STOKEs, supra note 130, at 76.
242 See id. at 77.
24 3 Id. at 79. Stokes points out many of these critics did not object to Protestant
Chaplains. See id. In fact, the Nativist attack on Roman Catholicism was based in part on the
belief that Protestantism was the true American faith and ought to be promoted and
encouraged.
2 44 See S. Misc. Doc. No. 30-2 (1848). Again, notice the Establishment Clause is
misquoted.
245 Id.
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cite Congress's power "'to raise and support armies,' and to 'provide for and
support a navy,' and 'to make rules for the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces."' 246 In the absence of a specific listing of officers to be
appointed, it was as "necessary and proper" to appoint chaplains as it was to
appoint "surgeons, or any of the numerous employe's in the medical staffl;]"247
"[both] are appointed under the [same] general authority to organize the army
and navy, and we deem the one as truly a matter of necessity as the other."248 As
far as congressional chaplains were concerned, Article I, section 2 of the
Constitution grants Congress power to appoint its own officers to the extent it
deemed this necessary and proper.249 Thus, "[t]he chaplain is an officer of the
house which chooses him, and nothing more. He owes his place not to his
belonging to a particular religious society, or holding a particular faith, but to the
voluntary choice of the members of the house....-250
Having established the source of congressional power, each of the reports
narrowly defines the scope of the Establishment Clause's limitation on that
power: "[Establishments] admit[ ] of no diversity in feature or substance; and
those who enter its temples to minister at its altars, must first be measured by,
and come up to its standards."251 "[Although the Founders] intended.., to
prohibit 'an establishment of religion' such as the English church
presented.., they did not intend to prohibit a just expression of religious
devotion by the legislators of the nation, even in their public character as
legislators." 252
The reports also stressed the nonsectarian nature of the chaplaincy: "There is
no standard of faith to be measured by, or form of worship that must be
24 6 H.R. REP. No. 171, at 1 (1850) [hereinafter Thompson's Report].
247 Id.
248 H.R. REP. No. 124, at 7 (1854) [hereinafter Meacham's Report].
249 See Thompson's Report, supra note 246, at 4.
250 S. REP. No. 376, at 2 (1853) [hereinafter Badger's Report].
251 Thompson's Report, supra note 246, at 2; see Badger's Report, supra note 250, at 1-
2. Badger's Report stated:
If Congress has passed, or should pass, any law which, fairly construed, has in any degree
introduced.., in favor of any church, or ecclesiastical association, or system of religious
faith, all or any one of these obnoxious particulars-endowment at public expense,
peculiar privileges to its members, or disadvantages or penalties upon those who should
reject its doctrines or belong to other communions-such a law would be a 'law
respecting an establishment of religion,' and therefore, in violation of the constitution. But
no law yet passed by Congress is justly liable to such an objection.
Id.
252 Badger's Report, supra note 250, at 4.
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followed. Practice has required that they be simply ministers of the gospel."2 53
"The range of selection is absolutely free in each house amongst all existing
professions, of religious faith. There is no compulsion exercised or attempted,
upon any member or officer of either house, to attend their prayers or religious
solemnities."254 Although the selection had until now always involved Christian
chaplains, "that is not in consequence of any legal right or privilege, but by the
voluntary choice of those who have power of appointment."255 The choice of
Christian chaplains "results from the fact that we are a Christian people... and
in a land thus universally Christian, what is to be expected, what desired, but that
we shall pay a due regard to Christianity, and have a reasonable respect for its
ministers and religious solemnities[.] ' 256
All of the reports placed particular emphasis on the fact that the practice of
federal employment of chaplains had roots going back to the first Congress,
indeed, back to Washington himself 2 57 The practice "has been long in use and
well known to the people."258 Thus, whatever the restrictions of the religion
clauses, "[t]ime and usage have given sanction to the employment of
[congressional] chaplains. 2 59 The fact that the practice had continued unabated
since the Founding, and that during that time no one denomination had
monopolized the office, undermined the claim that the employment of chaplains
might lead to a particular religious establishment 2 60
The reports also defended the federal chaplaincy as a means of promoting
the free exercise of religion:
Were the office abolished, the soldier or sailor might with more than a show of
plausibility complain that the "free exercise" of religion was denied him; that his
constitutional rights were infringed. The nature of his employment and the
necessity of discipline are such that he is not at liberty to go and enjoy the "free
exercise thereof," as the constitution provides. 261
253 Thompson's Report, supra note 246, at 2.
254 Badger's Report, supra note 250, at 2.
255Id. at3.
256 Id
257 See Meacham's Report, supra note 248, at 1; Badger's Report, supra note 250, at 1;
Thompson's Report, supra note 246, at 4.
258 Thompson's Report, supra note 246, at 3.
2 59 Id. at4.
260 Meacham's Report, supra note 248, at 5. Meacham's Report includes a table showing
the number and frequency of chaplains appointed from each religious sect. Id. at 9.
261 Thompson's Report, supra note 246, at 3. Thompson also argues that making
provision for religious exercise will make for better soldiers. Id. at 3-4. The Report found that:
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This argument was particularly true of sailors at sea: "[i]f you do not afford them
the means of religious service while at sea, the Sabbath is, to all intents and
purposes, annihilated, and we do not allow the crews the free exercise of
religion. ' 262
The "free exercise" argument also was used-though less plausibly-to
justify the employment of congressional chaplains. The 1853 Report by Senator
Badger pointed out that a number of private concerns of members are paid for at
public expense, including banking matters and other personal matters. Were
those funds withdrawn, 'ow are all to be accommodated in the churches of the
city? And of those who belong to either house of Congress some have not the
means to procure such accommodations for themselves. Where, then, is the
impropriety of having an officer to discharge these duties?" 263 One report argued
that, if the law could not accommodate the religious sentiments of members of
Congress, then neither could it close government offices on Sunday: "[t]he
officers who receive salaries, or per diem compensation, are discharged from
duty on this day, because it is the Christian Sabbath, and yet suffer no loss of
diminution of pay on that account. '264
Significantly, one report appears to rely on the Free Exercise Clause itself as
a source of power for Congress to legislate on the subject of religion.
Representative Meacham's 1854 Report to the House argued that legislation
protecting religious exercise was justified under the Free Exercise Clause itself:
There is a great and very prevalent error on this subject in the opinion that those
who organized the government did not legislate on religion. They did legislate
The spirit of Christianity has ever had a tendency to mitigate the rigors of war, if as yet it
has not been entirely able to prevent it; to lead to acts of charity and kindness; and to
humanize the hearts.... [To abolish it, in this Christian age of the world, would seem
like retrograding rather than advancing in civilization.
Id. In regard to chaplains at "Indian stations," Thompson noted: "On inquiry of the Indian
Bureau, it has been ascertained that no such office exists at such stations, and that when
clergymen are employed at such points it is as teachers of schools only." Id. at 4.
262 Meacham's Report, supra note 248, at 8.
263 Badger's Report supra note 250, at 2. Some members of Congress were more candid
in regard to the "free exercise" argument in favor of congressional chaplains. According to
Thompson's Report of 1850, "[t]he propriety and necessity for their employment [chaplains] at
the Capitol does not, perhaps, stand upon an equal footing in some respects with that of the
services already referred to." Thompson's Report, supra note 246, at 4. Nevertheless, "[t]ime
and usage have given sanction to the employment of [congressional] chaplains." Id.
264 Badger's Report, supra note 250, at 3. It is interesting to compare Badger's argument
with contemporary state court rulings upholding Sabbath Closing laws on the grounds of their
secular utility, not their religious implications. See Lash, supra note 79, at 1105.
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on it by making it free to all, "to the Jew and the Greek, to the learned and
unlearned." The error has arisen from the belief that there is no legislation unless
in permissive or restricting enactments. But making a thing free is as truly a part
of legislation as confining it by limitations; and what the government has made
free, it is bound to keep free.26 5
Meacham's argument is a rare example-indeed, the only one I know of prior to
the Civil War-of a Congressman justifying a law on the subject of religion on
the ground that such power was granted to Congress by way of the First
Amendment.
All three reports utilize arguments that unambiguously contradict the "no
federal power principle." First, the reports expressly rely on congressional power
to regulate religion when necessary and proper under a separately enumerated
power. Secondly, the religion clauses are distinguished and given separate
substantive definitions: the Establishment Clause in particular is narrowly
construed to apply only to sectarian or coercive regulation of religion. Finally,
one report cites the Free Exercise Clause itself as a potential source of
congressional power to protect the free exercise of religion.
As was the case with militia exemptions, the weight of these statements as a
matter of original intent is weakened by the fact that these arguments were not
presented until more than sixty years after the ratification of the Constitution.
Moreover, the arguments advanced to justify government chaplains cannot be
reconciled with express statements made both by the Founders and members of
Congress in the decades that followed the adoption of the Constitution. For
example, Senator Badger's argument states that government offices are closed
on the Sabbath, "because it is the Christian Sabbath" seems directly at odds with
Senator Richards' 1830 Report on Sunday mail delivery which expressed the
view that Congress had no power whatsoever over religion-especially on
matters involving the Christian Sabbath.266 In particular, Meacham's argument
that the Free Exercise Clause introduced a degree of federal power over the
subject of religion is simply not plausible as matter of original intent-nor does
he cite any Founder or Founding period document to support such an
interpretation.
4. Treaties with Foreign Nations
At the Founding, it was to the advantage of the federal government to keep
religion out of foreign affairs. According to the 1797 Treaty with Tripoli:
265 Meacham's Report, supra note 248, at 9.
2 66 See supra Part IV.C.2.
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As the government of the United States of America is not in any sense
founded on the Christian religion-as it has in itself no character of enmity
against the laws, religion or tranquillity of Musselmen-and as the said states
never have entered into any war or act of hostility against any Mahometan
nation, it is declared by the parties, that no pretext arising from religious
opinions shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the
two countries.26
7
More than half a century later, the Senate was forced to consider whether its
power to ratify a treaty should be used to require affirmative protection of the
free exercise rights of citizens abroad. In 1850, the Taylor administration
negotiated a commercial treaty with Switzerland that protected only Christian-
American citizens traveling abroad.26 8 American Jews complained and lobbied
for express language guaranteeing them equal rights to enjoy the privileges
extended under the treaty.2 69 Upon taking office, President Fillmore sent a
message to the Senate stating:
It is quite certain that neither by law, nor by treaty, nor by any other official
proceeding is it competent for the Government of the United States to establish
any distinction between its citizens founded on differences in religious
beliefs... [ ] and we are not at liberty, on a question of such vital interest and
plain constitutional duty, to consider whether the particular case is one in which
substantial inconvenience or injustice might ensue. It is enough that an
inequality would be sanctioned hostile to the institutions of the United States and
inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws. 270
The Senate accepted the proposed treaty only if the offending clause was
267 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Nov. 4, 1776-Jan. 3, 1797, U.S.-Tripoli, art. XI, 8
Stat. 154, 155. The clause indicating that the U.S. is not founded on the Christian religion was
omitted from the 1805 Treaty of Peace and Amity which superceded the earlier treaty. See I
STOKES, supra note 130, at 498.
268 Borden wrote:
On account of the tenor of the Federal Constitution of Switzerland, Christians alone are
entitled to the enjoyment of the privileges guaranteed by the present Article in the Swiss
Cantons. But said cantons are not prohibited from extending the same privileges to
citizens of the United States of other religious persuasions.
BORDEN, supra note 118, at 83. The proposed Treaty reflected the fact that numerous Swiss
Cantons discriminated against Jewish merchants. See id.
269 See id.
270 Id. at 84 (quoting 8 J. ExEcuTrvE PROC. SENATE U.S. 290 (1852)).
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removed.271 Switzerland countered the Senate's proposal by rewording the
article:
The citizens of the United States of America and the citizens of Switzerland,
shall be admitted and treated upon a footing of reciprocal equality in the two
countries, where such admission and treatment shall not conflict with the
constitutional or legal provisions, as well Federal as State and Cantonal of the
contracting parties.272
American Jews continued to object, believing that this proviso amounted to the
same thing-Jews would be left subject to the discriminatory laws of individual
Swiss cantons.273 In response to continued complaints, in 1853, Senator Joseph
Underwood of Kentucky submitted a report to the House that recommended:
Resoli'ed: That it would be just and wise on the part of the Government of
the United States in future treaties with foreign nations to secure, if practicable,
to our citizens residing abroad the right of worshipping God freely and openly
according to the dictates of their own consciences by providing that they shall
not be disturbed, molested or annoyed in any manner on account of their
religious belief, nor in the proper exercise of their peculiar religion, either within
their own private houses or in churches, chapels, or other places appointed for
public worship... in convenient situations interfering in no way with or
respecting the religion and customs of the country in which they reside.
Resolved, further, That it would be just and wise in our future treaties with
foreign nations to secure to our citizens residing abroad the right to purchase and
own burial places and to bury any of our citizens dying abroad in such places
with those religious ceremonies and observances deemed appropriate by the
surviving relatives and friends of the deceased. 274
Speaking in support of Underwood's Resolutions, Senator Cass argued that
the United States had the right to "procure for American citizens abroad
immunity from local laws, so far as these interfere with the liberty of
worshipping God.' 275 "Jew or Gentile, all are equal in this land of law and
liberty; and as the former suffers most from illiberal persecution, his case is
entitled to the most commiserations, and sure am I that public sentiment would
271 See id.
272 Id. (quoting HUNTER MILLER, 5 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE
UNrrED STATES OF AMERICA 846 (1937)).
273 See id. at 86-87. Note, however, that it allowed the Senate to proceed in a formally
religious neutral basis.
274 Id. at 87-88.
275 CONG. GLOBE, 33 Cong., 1st Sess. 681-91 (1854).
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strongly reprove any attempt to create a distinction between them."276
Ultimately, the Senate passed both the Underwood resolutions and the proposed
Swiss amendments to the treaty.277 Underwood's resolutions may have had an
impact on the drafting of the subsequent 1858 Treaty with China:
The principles of the Christian religion as professed by the Protestant and
Roman Catholic churches, are recognised as teaching men to do good, and to do
to others as they would have others do to them. Hereafter, those who quietly
profess and teach these doctrines shall not be harassed or persecuted on account
of their faith. Any person, whether citizen of the United States or Chinese
convert, who according to these tenets peaceably teach and practise the
principles of Christianity, shall in no case be interfered with or molested.278
The Underwood Resolutions and, more so, the 1858 Treaty with China, are
congressional attempts to protect the religious freedom of United States citizens
overseas. 279 It is not clear whether Congress was doing so pursuant to its power
to ratify treaties, or as part of its responsibility to ensure that "no laws are made
prohibiting the free exercise of religion," or both. Interestingly, some members
warned that efforts to secure religious liberty overseas might give Congress an
excuse to secure free exercise in the several states.280 At no time, however, was
any voice raised objecting to the use of congressional power in an effort to secure
the free exercise of United States citizens abroad.
The Senate's efforts to secure religious liberty overseas are unambiguous
276 Id.
2 77 See BORDEN, supra note 118, at 90 (reporting that the Underwood resolutions were
passed sometime after the proviso was approved). See generally 2 STOKES, supra note 130, at
438-39 (stating that the upper echelons of the United States government responded to the
indignation of Jewish citizens at the treatment of American Jews in Europe).
278 7 MILLER, supra note 272, at 804; see also BORDEN, supra note 118, at 79. A.P.
Stokes reports that this provision appeared in the 1903-1904 Treaty with China. See 2 STOKES,
supra note 130, at 422.
279 Morton Borden notes that, at the time of the treaty, there were Jews living in China,
and that the treaty was, therefore, an example of Christian hegemony in the U.S. government.
See BORDEN, supra note 118, at 79. Borden does not mention whether these Jews were
American citizens, or if so, whether they were engaged in religious activities that would have
aroused the ire of the local officials. The only "oppression" facing the Jews in China Borden
mentions involved the zealous activities of the Christian missionaries. See id. at 82.
280 Senator George Badger-the same senator who argued in favor of federal power to
secure religious liberty during the chaplain debates-asked Senator Cass whether passing the
Resolutions implied that Congress would have power to secure domestic religious liberty
should there ever "be a state or States prohibiting religious toleration ..... CONG. GLOBE, 33d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1187 (1854). Cass responded that Badger's hypothetical was an "impossible
case." Id
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legislative actions on the subject of religious liberty. Placed alongside militia
exemptions and the arguments in favor of federal chaplains, the treaties may well
reflect a growing feeling on the part of Congress in the mid-nineteen hundreds
that securing religious liberty required affirmative action by the government.
Once again, had these treaties been ratified closer to the Founding, they would
have been stronger evidence of an original understanding that Congress had
some power to protect the free exercise of United States citizens. The weight of
such evidence, however, is substantially weakened by its late occurrence. On the
other hand, to the extent that these activities reflected a new understanding of
religious liberty, they may be quite relevant to the intended scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment.281
D. Summary
There is only one unambiguous example of congressional regulation of
religion contemporaneous with the Founding-federal chaplains-and this
practice was not publicly justified by Congress until long after the Founding. In
light of the most plausible account of the original understanding of the religion
clauses, a reasonable conclusion would be that the appointment of federal
chaplains was unconstitutional. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the same
people who framed the Constitution might occasionally support actions that
cannot reasonably be reconciled with the most plausible interpretation of that
document. Most scholars believe this is precisely what happened with the
passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts.282 Moreover, the appointment of
government chaplains was a common and uncontroversial practice in the states
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and nothing about the federal
appointment implicated the rights of states-or of individuals-outside Congress
and the military. Given the fact that core Federalist aspects of the religion clauses
were not called into question, it seems at least as plausible to believe that
Congress might err on the matter of chaplains, as on the more politically
sensitive matter of seditious libel. Moreover, whatever weight this action might
have, it is vastly outweighed by the more plausible interpretation of the text and
the remarkably consistent public interpretations of the religion clauses by those
most closely involved with their enactment.
There is also evidence that, in the years approaching the Civil War, Congress
began to act on the understanding that it had some degree of power to protect the
religious exercise of United States citizens. Once again, however, there is no
evidence that any of the Founders shared this view at the time of the adoption of
281 See infra Part V.
282 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,273-77 (1964).
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the Constitution and its first ten amendments. Over and over, in a variety of
ways, and from a variety of ideological points of view, when they addressed the
issue, the Founders expressly declared that Congress had no power whatsoever
over the subject of religion. There is not a single piece of evidence that any
Founder believed the contrary.
Finally, even these few exceptions generally track a Federalist reading of the
religion clauses. Congress's power to enact legislation pursuant to a treaty, or
establishing the federal chaplaincy, are analogous to Congress's power in the
territories: neither interfere with state regulation of religion or even imply
concurrent federal power to regulate religion in the states.283 Thus, these
"exceptions" do not necessarily call into question the First Amendment's
prohibition against any law "federalizing" any aspect of the subject of religion-
that subject being an area reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.
Overcoming that barrier would require an amendment to the Constitution.
V. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "[tihe Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. '284
"The provisions" of the Fourteenth Amendment include both the Privileges or
Immunities Clause (considered by some as the intended vehicle for incorporation
of the Bill of Rights) 285 and the Due Process Clause-the clause actually relied
upon by the Court for incorporation. 286 I have argued elsewhere that there is
good reason to believe that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
considered both free exercise and non-establishment to be privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.287 I will not repeat those arguments
here and will proceed on the assumption that the religion clauses are legitimately
"incorporated" against the states, whether through the Privileges or Immunities
Clause or the Due Process Clause.
Incorporation, however, creates a dilemma. If the religion clauses are among
283 The exception here would be the military exemption which arguably interfered with
state regulation of religious exemptions from military service.
2 84 U. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
285 See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986); Amar,
Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 109; Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993); John Harrison, Reconstructing the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992); Lash, supra note 79; Lash, supra
note 3.
286 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
287 See Lash, supra note 79; Lash, supra note 3.
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the "provisions" of the Fourteenth Amendment, then section 5 read literally
would grant Congress power to enforce the religion clauses against state
abridgment.288 But how can Congress sensibly be granted power over the subject
of religion in order to enforce a provision that prohibits congressional power
over that very subject? Even if Congress's power under section 5 is limited to
legislation prohibiting state legislation on the subject of religion,289 and
providing remedies for the same,290 such legislation would still conflict with the
most plausible reading of the original First Amendment. As discussed in Part II,
the original no power principle was intended, at least in part, to protect state
religious establishments from federal interference. Thus, section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment appears to allow what the First Amendment forbids.
One could avoid the dilemma by conceding the general legitimacy of
incorporation, but limiting its scope. Professor Akhil Amar, for example, has
suggested that there may be less reason to incorporate the Establishment Clause
than the Free Exercise Clause.291 Amar's theory is based in large part on a
288 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966). Although the Court recently
struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as beyond congressional power under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, see City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), the
problem in Boerne was that Congress had exercised broader powers than necessary to remedy
potential violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. The Court assumed that Congress
had some degree of power to protect against intentional state abridgment of religious liberty.
See id.
289 See supra note 288.
290 For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for persons whose constitutional
rights have been abridged by officials acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1994). Professor Jed Rubenfeld argues that the "antidisestablishment" norm that informed the
original Establishment Clause remains in place even after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the incorporation of the Establishment Clause. See Rubenfeld, supra note 16,
at 2373-78. He thus believes that, although Congress has power under § 5 to pass legislation of
general applicability like § 1983, Congress does not have power to legislate national norms of
the subject of religious liberty. See id. at 2378-80. Thus, the original religion clauses restrict
congressional enforcement of the incorporated religion clauses, in a manner not true for the
enforcement of other incorporated liberties. See id. at 2378. Professor Rubenfeld does not cite
any historical evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have intended
such a limitation on congressional power, but instead argues that such a special restriction is
warranted given the original purpose to keep the subject of religion out of the hands of the
federal government. See id. at 2351-58. Although he is surely correct regarding the original
interpretation of the clauses, there is much evidence that very different interpretations
developed in the period between the Founding and Reconstruction. See supra Part IV; see also
Lash, supra note 79; Lash, supra note 3.
291 See Amar, supra note 79, at 1157; Amar, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 109, at
1232. More recently, Professor Amar has conceded the possibility that by 1868, the
Establishment Clause was no longer interpreted as a states' rights provision. See AKHIL REED
AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS 246-57 (1998).
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reading of the original First Amendment that distinguishes the Free Exercise
Clause from the "states' rights protective" Establishment Clause.292 However
plausible this approach might be,293 the conflict between the First and Fourteenth
Amendments remains even if the Establishment Clause drops off the list of
incorporated rights. If the Free Exercise Clause is incorporated, then section 5
grants Congress power to enforce free exercise in the states. This power could be
applied to prohibit state laws that discriminate among one or more religions on
the basis of a preferred religious belief.294 Thus, even if only the Free Exercise
Clause was incorporated, we are still left with irreconcilable amendments. 295
Another way to reconcile the First and Fourteenth Amendments would be to
remove religion from the list of subjects within the reach of section 5.296 For
example, even if the religion clauses are appropriately incorporated against the
states through section 1, perhaps there was no intention to bring the subject of
religion within the reach of congressional power under section 5. This seems to
preserve the vision of both the original religion clauses (no congressional power)
and the goals of the new Fourteenth Amendment (protect religious liberty against
state action). The problem here is justifying such a reading in light of the text and
what we know of the historical intent behind the Fourteenth Amendment. The
text makes no mention of the subject of religion at all, much less addresses it as
an exception to section 5's grant of congressional power. Moreover, there is no
evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended section 5 to
reach some, but not all, of the liberties protected under section 1. On the
contrary, some of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly
292 Id.
293 I believe the historical evidence strongly suggests that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to incorporate both clauses. See generally Lash, supra note 3.
2 94 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 520
(1993). Discrimination on the basis of religion is now almost the sole focus on the Free
Exercise Clause. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990) (stating that the Free Exercise Clause generally does not require religious
exemptions from generally applicable laws). In Lukumi, the Court noted that free exercise
principles are violated whenever a law "discriminates against some or all religious beliefs."
Lukumni, 508 U.S. at 532. Thus, a state religious establishment that distributes benefits to some,
but not all religions, would trigger free exercise protection, just as preferential treatment
triggers discrimination analysis under the Equal Protection Clause. See Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
295 Note that power to enforce free exercise would include power to remedy past or
prevent future intentional discrimination against religion. See City of Rome v. United States,
466 U.S. 156 (1980); Morgan v. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Even after the recent
decision of City of Boerne v. lores, Congress still has power to act where there is some
evidence that intentional discrimination is going unremedied. See 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
296 See Bybee, supra note 16, at 1616-19; Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 2378-80.
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mentioned the religion clauses and the rights of conscience to be among the
liberties the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to protect 297 and that section 5
granted Congress power to enforce those liberties.298
Even if one questions whether there is sufficient evidence that the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment intended to incorporate any provision from the Bill
of Rights, there is no evidence that any member of the Thirty-Ninth Congress
considered the religion clauses to be inappropriate candidates for incorporation,
or inappropriate subjects for congressional enforcement against state action.299
297 In an 1871 speech, John Bingham, the author of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
read the first eight amendments, including both religion clauses, and declared that the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect all such privileges or immunities. See CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1 st Sess. 365-68 (1871). Senator Thomas Norwood noted in 1874, "Before
[the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment] any state might have established a particular
religion... But can a state do so now? If not why?. . . The reason is, that the citizens of the
United States have the new guarantee under the fourteenth amendment." CONG. REc., 43d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1874). Henry Dawes interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to protect "free
exercise of... religious belief." Id. Many members of Congress cited the South's abridgment
of religious liberty as one of the problems meant to be addressed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. See generally Lash, supra note 3.
298 According to John Bingham, the drafter of § I of the Fourteenth Amendment, "[t]he
fourteenth amendment closes with the words, 'the Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article'-the whole of it, sir; all the provisions of
the article; every section of it." ALFRED AvINs, THE RECONSTRUCION AMENDMENTs'
DEBATES 509 (1967). In a speech introducing the Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate,
Senator Jacob M. Howard read the Bill of Rights, including the religion clauses, and then
explained:
Now, sir, there is no power given in the Constitution to enforce and carryout any of these
guarantees. They are not powers granted by the Constitution to Congress, and of course
do not come within the sweeping clause of the Constitution authorizing Congress to pass
all laws necessary and proper for carrying out the... granted powers, but they stand
simply as a bill of rights in the Constitution, without power on the part of Congress to
give them full effect; while at the same time the states are not restrained from violating the
principles embraced in them except by their own local constitutions, which may be altered
from year to year. The great object of the first section of this amendment is, therefore, to
restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these great
fundamental guarantees. How will it be done under the present amendment? As I have
remarked, they are not powers granted to Congress, and therefore it is necessary, if they
are to be effectuated and enforced, as they assuredly ought to be, that additional power
should be given to Congress to that end. This is done by the fifth section .... Here is a
direct affirmative delegation of power to Congress to carry out all the principles of all
these guarantees, a power not found in the Constitution.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766,2768 (1866).
2 99 See Lash, supra note 3; Lash, supra note 79.
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Indeed, as discussed in the previous section, in the period just prior to
Reconstruction, some members of Congress acted on the understanding that the
Free Exercise Clause justified legislation protecting religious conduct.300 Thus,
there is no indication in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the history
surrounding its adoption, suggesting that Congress intended to treat religious
liberty differently from any other incorporated right under sections 1 and 5.301
There is, however, one way to reconcile the First and Fourteenth
Amendment in a manner that grants Congress some degree of power over the
subject of religion. Although the original First Amendment denied Congress
such power, the First Amendment as of 1868 granted or permitted legislation on
the subject of religion. In other words, it is conceivable that the First Amendment
was implicitly amended at the same time that it was incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment.
There is nothing unusual about a new amendment implicitly amending an
old one. An obvious, if controversial, example is the Eleventh Amendment's
effect on federal court jurisdiction to hear suits brought against a state or state
level official.302 Less controversially, "reverse incorporation" theory presumes
that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause amended the
substantive scope of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.303 Certainly
300 See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
301 One could argue that the mere logic of incorporation requires distinguishing the
religion clauses from other incorporated rights within the reach of § 5. The argument would be
that because the incorporated rights were express restrictions on congressional power, they
cannot fall within the reach of § 5-at least absent express language demanding as much. See,
e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 2378-80. This argument, of course, presumes that Congress
intended to incorporate the religion clauses as those clauses were understood in 1789. This, of
course, is literally impossible: incorporation of the Establishment Clause is impossible unless
that amendment no longer means what it meant in 1789. See supra Part II. As far as the need
for express language is concerned, this is the reason why the Court rejected the "incorporation"
reading of the privileges or immunities clause in the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36
(1872). It is difficult to understand how one could accept implied incorporation (thus
"amending" the original Federalist-based clauses to now apply against the states), but not
accept an implied expansion of congressional power due to a clear statement requirement. Put
another way, the need for a clear statement is really an argument against incorporation in
general.
302 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI ('The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.");
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). But see Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of
Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 246-52
(1985) (rejecting the current interpretation of the 11 th Amendment as a broad expression of
state sovereign immunity).
303 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
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the Thirteenth Amendment changed the original understanding of "property"
protected under the Fifth Amendment. 30 4 Thus, there is nothing theoretically
implausible about the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment implicitly amended
the First. The important question is whether it is plausible that those who framed
and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment intended such a transformation.
There is a significant body of evidence which suggests that, by the time of
Reconstruction, the Establishment Clause was interpreted at both a state and
federal level, as expressing a principle of individual liberty (as opposed to a
declaration of state prerogative).305 For example, prior to the Civil War, state
courts for years had looked to the federal Establishment Clause for guidance in
interpreting the religion clauses of their state's constitution.306 This makes sense
only if the federal provision was read as an expression of individual liberty.
During this same period, Congress began to interpret the Free Exercise Clause as
a provision justifying-and perhaps requiring-congressional legislation
protecting religious freedom. 30 7
As noted in the previous sections, these examples are not plausible
interpretations of the original religion clauses. They are, however, indications of
what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment might have meant when they
quoted the religion clauses as liberties to be protected under section 1 and section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. These "new" interpretations are also relevant to
understanding what We the People of 1868 thought they were doing when they
ratified the proposed amendment. Put another way, even if the popular
understanding of the First Amendment in 1868 was nothing more than wishful
thinking (and erroneous as an historical matter), there was nothing to prevent the
people from making their wish the Constitution's command. The people, after
all, have the right to change their collective minds and add their new
interpretation of the First Amendment to the text of the Fourteenth. In doing so,
the First Amendment would have been amended insofar as its original purpose
and scope were inconsistent with the purpose and scope of the Fourteenth.
Thus, section 5 stands as a plausible source of congressional power over the
subject of religion. This is not to say there is incontrovertible evidence that it was
(1954).
304 Similarly, some scholars argue that the provisions of the Bill of Rights changed their
shape in the process of being incorporated against the states. See Amar, Fourteenth
Amendment, supra note 109. Note that Professor Amar addresses the issue of incorporation of
the religion clauses differently than I do----especially in regard to the Establishment Clause.
305 See generally Lash, supra note 79.
306 See id. at 1105-31.
307 This occurred in limited settings that were generally beyond the states' domain. See
supra Part IV (discussion regarding foreign treaties, religious exemptions from military service,
and the federal chaplaincy).
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meant to serve as such. There are plausible arguments against incorporation in
general, and possible (though, I think less plausible) arguments against the
incorporation of one or both of the religion clauses. However, I think the best
reading of the text and the history surrounding its adoption indicates an intent to
both include religious liberty within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment and
to give Congress power to enforce the same against state action. In any event,
however convincing my account might be, there does not appear to be any other
plausible source of congressional power on the subject of religion.
A. Implications
Exploring the full implications of section 5 power over the subject of
religion deserves more space than I can devote to it here. It is possible, however,
to trace the likely outlines of such power, if it exists.
First, even if section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment affects the substantive
content of the First Amendment, that effect logically would be limited to the
scope and purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because section 5 grants
Congress power to enforce the incorporated religion clauses, congressional
power over religion would exist only to the extent appropriate to enforce those
incorporated norms.308 For example, under section 5, Congress could regulate
religion in regard to state action, but Congress would have no power to regulate
private religious conduct.30 9 Similarly, although the amended First Amendment
would probably allow Congress to address the subject of religion in its exercise
of enumerated responsibilities, that power would be limited to cases where
federal law itself threatened to abridge the religion clauses.310
308 This point was recently emphasized by the Supreme Court. See City of Boeme v.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
309 Both the Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses are protections against
state, not private, action. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883). Thus, Congress would have no power to regulate parental religious instruction of their
children, or to regulate the theological decisions of religious institutions. See, e.g., United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
Rubenfeld argues that interpreting § 5 as a source of congressional power to create national
norms of religious freedom would give Congress power to enact the Children's Religious
Freedom Act which would prohibit states from allowing parents unsupervised authority over
the religious upbringing of their children unless the state ensures that parents not compel their
children to practice a particular religion. See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 2371-72. However,
under any traditional theory of state action, such parental decisionmaking is not attributable to
the state, and thus would not fall within Congress's § 5 powers.
310This not only makes sense as a matter of constitutional text and Fourteenth
Amendment history, it also tracks the Supreme Court's unitary interpretation of the First
Amendment as applied against both state and federal governments.
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Congressional power under section 5, then, depends upon the scope of the
religion clauses. The current Court interprets the Free Exercise Clause as almost
never requiring an exemption from a generally applicable law.311 Under a
section 5 reading of congressional power, Congress's ability to legislate on
behalf of free exercise is limited accordingly. Even under Smith, however,
Congress may enact prophylactic laws that seek to remedy or prevent hard-to-
discover intentional government discrimination, 312  as well as laws
accommodating free exercise when it is linked to a separate First Amendment
right, like freedom of speech, 313 or is threatened by potentially discriminatory
administrative enforcement.3 14
Secondly, under section 5, Congress would have power to enforce both
religion clauses. As was pointed out above, nothing in the text or history justifies
distinguishing the Establishment Clause from the Free Exercise Clause in terms
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although Congress generally has regulated
religion on behalf of free exercise liberty, there is nothing to prevent it from
regulating on behalf of nonestablishment, to the extent that doing so does not
conflict with another provision of the Constitution. For example, if the Court
interprets the Establishment Clause to prohibit government action that creates a
reasonable perception of government endorsement of religion, under section 5,
Congress could act to prevent potential violations of this norm. For example,
Congress might pass legislation requiring states to erect an appropriately sized
disclaimer accompanying any private religious display in a public forum. 315
More controversially, to the extent that the Court continues to uphold the Lemon
Test, Congress might pass legislation forbidding states from directly subsidizing
religious schools as part of a general school voucher program.316 To the extent
the Court limits the scope of the Establishment Clause in future cases, the
311 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
312 See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641 (1966).
313 See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 872; West Virginia v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
314 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
315 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 782 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
316 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking down state financial aid to
private religious schools). But see Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding constitutionality of providing vocational rehabilitation assistance
to a student at a private Catholic college); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. I
(1993) (upholding constitutionality of providing a publicly funded sign language interpreter to
a deaf Catholic school student).
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congressional power over the establishment of religion would be similarly
restricted (as is true under the Free Exercise Clause).
Third, the Fourteenth Amendment would have no effect on Congress's
incapacity to regulate religion as a "necessary and proper" means to a separately
enumerated end. The Fourteenth Amendment speaks only of "enforcing" the
freedoms of section 1. Although Congress seems to have regulated on the subject
of religion in the period just prior to Reconstruction, these actions were justified
(or were justifiable) as attempts to prevent the government itself from violating
the free exercise as it was then understood. For example, although the
establishment of federal chaplains was partially justified under Congress's power
to regulate the military (and create its own staff), both chaplaincies were
expressly linked to free exercise concerns. 317 The Civil War militia exemptions
seem to be an attempt to conform federal law to the requirements of free
exercise.318 Finally, the religious provisions in foreign treaties were obvious
attempts to protect U.S. citizens overseas from religious discrimination.319 In
each case, there was a colorable claim that failing to act would result in an
abridgment of the free exercise rights of U.S. citizens. There is no evidence in
either the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the history surrounding its
adoption, suggesting that Congress should have power to regulate religion in
order to, say, facilitate the flow of Interstate Commerce 320 or to enforce the
religious provisions of a treaty absent a need to protect the free exercise rights of
U.S. citizens.321
3 17 See supra Part IV.C.3.
318 See supra Part IV.C.1.b; see also Lash, supra note 3.
3 19 See supra note Part IV.CA and accompanying text.
320 But see Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e0)
(1994) (banning religious discrimination in private employment and requiring employers to
reasonably accommodate the religious practices of their employees if they can do so without
undue hardship).
321 One might argue that, because the religion clauses were "reconstructed" in a manner
that allowed for federal protection of free exercise and nonestablishment, that same
transformation should be viewed as having lifted the original (Federalist) bar against regulating
religion as an aspect of commerce (or another enumerated power). I do not believe, however,
that the evidence supports such a broad reading of the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Not only is there no support for such a view in either the text or history surrounding the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, there also are non-Federalist reasons for retaining the
original restriction on federal power to use religion as a means to an enumerated end. For
example, advancing the exercise of religion beyond that required by the Free Exercise Clause
or justified under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment might be viewed as unjustifiable
promotion of religion. Therefore, because neither the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor
the logic of incorporation, nor the debates surrounding its adoption, necessarily raise the issue
of federal power beyond those granted under § 5, 1 see no historical justification for doing so.
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Finally, there is the question of state government power over the subject of
religion. Although the original federal government had no plausible source of
power over the subject of religion, power to regulate religion was reserved to the
states under the Tenth Amendment. Thus, it is at least theoretically possible that,
even after incorporation, states might have some residual power to regulate
religion even in the absence of a constitutional mandate, so long as the regulation
does not violate the norms of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. Once
again, however, this reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, has no support in the
text of the amendment, and little (if any) support in history. The text of the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from making or enforcing any law
abridging the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." To the
extent that these privileges or immunities were intended to include the
contemporary understanding of the federal religion clauses, then the text requires
those same norms be applied against the states. In other words, whatever effect
the First Amendment had on the legitimate powers of the federal government, so
now would the Fourteenth Amendment affect the legitimate powers of the states.
This unitary reading of the norms of free exercise and establishment is
supported by the history surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In the period leading up to Reconstruction, northern courts began to
interpret their own state constitution's protection of free exercise and
nonestablishment as reflecting the same norms expressed by the federal religion
clauses.322 State supreme court after state supreme court came to embrace the
idea that what was true at the federal level should be true at the state level when
it came to power over the subject of religion.323 In fact, I have found no evidence
suggesting that any member of Congress, or any state official, believed that the
states should have greater power over the subject of religion than the federal
government.
Without evidence to the contrary, then, the most plausible reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment would be as follows: to the extent that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the (new) principles of the First Amendment against
the states, the scope of state power over the subject of religion became equal to
that of the federal government. This means that, at the state level, government
power over the subject of religion is permitted only to the extent that such power
is allowed under the norms of the religion clauses themselves. Moreover, even if
exemptions are not considered an exercise of power, and therefore permissible
under the First Amendment, Congress would not have power to require states to
exempt religiously motivated conduct from generally applicable state laws
unless failing to grant the exemption arguably would trigger the protections of
322 See Lash, supra note 79, at 1133-34.
323 See id.
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the Free Exercise Clause.324 Similarly, federal or state laws singling out religion
in an effort to separate church and state would be justified only where failing to
do so threatened to violate nonestablishment norms as interpreted by the
Supreme Court.325
VI. CONCLUSION
There are three possible sources of federal power to regulate on the subject
of religion: the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, the original First
Amendment Clauses, and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Of these
three, only section 5 appears to be a plausible source of congressional power. If
section 5 is such a source, then the most reasonable way to reconcile the religion
clauses of the First Amendment and section 5 of the Fourteenth is to interpret the
Fourteenth Amendment as implicitly amending the original religion clauses at
the same time that it incorporated them against state action.
This account challenges the assumption made by most scholars that
Congress has some degree of discretionary power over the subject of religion by
way of the Necessary and Proper Clause.326 There is no support for such an
interpretation in either the text of the Constitution or in the historical records of
the Founding. In fact, the text of the First Amendment, as well as the history
surrounding the adoption of the original Constitution and its first ten
amendments, make any provision in the original Constitution a highly
implausible source of power over the subject of religion.
Although I have suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment is a potential
source of congressional power over the subject of religion, there is something to
be said against this possibility as well. The entire subject of incorporation as a
matter of original intent remains controversial, even if unlikely to be reversed.327
324 Presumably, the government would not have to wait until the Court declared that a
particular accommodation was required. Moreover, under current principles, a legislative
determination that an accommodation was required would be entitled to some deference from
the Court. There are limits, however, to such deference.. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S.
Ct. 2157 (1997).
325 This seems to be the logical corollary to the Court's holding in Boerne that Congress
has power to regulate free exercise only to the extent that there is a plausible threat to free
exercise as interpreted by the Court. See id. This calls into question numerous state
constitutional provisions interpreted by state courts as "broader in scope" than the federal
establishment clause. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
32 6 See sources cited supra notes 17-18. It equally challenges those scholars who deny
congressional power to regulate religion under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
327 Compare Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIo ST. Li. 435 (1981), with Michael Curtis, Further
Adventures of the Nine-Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the Bill of
Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.L 89, 89 (1982); see Amar, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 109.
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Even if the doctrine of incorporation is conceded as a general matter, some
scholars argue that incorporation does not apply with equal force to the religion
clauses of the First Amendment.328 Finally, even assuming that the religion
clauses were incorporated, and were intended to be within the scope of section 5,
the idea that incorporation implicitly amends the substantive scope of the First
Amendment may strike some readers as unreasonable.329
Nevertheless, this appears to be the most plausible account-indeed, the
only plausible account-of congressional power on the subject of religion. This
article merely traces the possible outlines of how the Fourteenth Amendment
changes and interacts with the limitations of the original First Amendment. The
subject deserves a much fuller discussion. But the very difficulty of the issue,
and the obvious need for further exploration, belie the extraordinary silence in
the current literature regarding just how and when the Constitution granted
Congress power to regulate religion. The Supreme Court's current narrowing of
the scope of both religion clauses calls into question the legal basis for the
myriad ways in which both state and federal governments continue to exercise
power over the subject of religion. This article hopes to trigger a serious
discussion regarding the source and scope of that power.
32 8 See Amar, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 109 (arguing that the establishment
clause may not be an appropriate candidate for incorporation); Bybee, supra note 16, at 1609
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to incorporate either religion
clause).
32 9 See Rubenfeld, supra note 16.
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